Lowering the Bar or Raising the Stakes? The Causes, Compromises and Consequences of the U.K.’s Listing Rules Reforms

By Dr. Daniel Summerfield

1. Introduction

Age and experience may allow us to learn from past mistakes. Unfortunately, this is not always the case for market regulators. In the U.K., we are once again reminded that no problem is so bad that government or regulatory intervention can’t make it worse.

In July 2024, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) introduced the most significant overhaul of the U.K.’s listing regime in more than 30 years, and in doing so, implemented reforms that weakened previously sacro-sanct investor protections. This shift risks encouraging companies with weaker governance standards to take advantage of the looser requirements and list in the U.K. Let’s not forget, we’ve been here before!

2. Background to changes

In 2024, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) witnessed a historic low in initial public offerings (IPOs), with only 18 companies making their debut. This figure represents a 22% decrease from 2023, and a 60% drop compared to 2022. The year also saw 88 companies delist or transfer their primary listings from the LSE, marking the largest exodus since the global financial crisis, with many citing declining liquidity and lower valuations in London com­pared to markets like the U.S.

This was accompanied – as a cause or consequence – by U.K. pension funds markedly reducing their allocations to domestic equities over recent decades. As of 2024, only 4.4% of U.K. pension assets were invested in U.K.-listed shares, a steep decline from over 50% in the early 2000s. This allocation is among the lowest compared to other developed pension systems, with only Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway having lower domestic equity exposures.

To counter these developments – and clearly encouraged by some stakeholders and government-backed strategic reviews – the FCA led a reform process to revitalise the U.K. capital markets by addressing “the overly-prescriptive regulation which was seen as stifling entrepreneurial risk-taking and deterring the very kind of innovative companies the U.K. needs to attract.”

3. Key changes in the listing rules Consolidation into a single listing category

The previous dual structure of ‘Premi-um’ and ‘Standard’ listing segments has been replaced with a unified category called Equity Shares of Commercial Companies (ESCC). This is designed to make the U.K. listing process more accessible, particularly for high-growth and founder-led companies.

Shift to a disclosure-based regime

The FCA has moved towards a more disclosure-oriented approach, reducing the need for mandatory shareholder votes on significant transactions and related party transactions.

Relaxed eligibility criteria

To encourage more companies to list in the U.K., the FCA has eased certain eligibility requirements:

• Free float requirement: Reduced from 25% to 10%, allowing founders and early investors to retain greater control post-IPO.

• Track record: Elimination of the three-year revenue track record requirement.

• Working capital statements: Removal of the need for a clean working capital statement at the time of listing.

Enhanced flexibility for dual-class share structures

The new rules permit greater flexibility around dual-class share structures, enabling founders and key stakeholders to maintain enhanced voting rights.

Introduction of additional listing categories

Beyond the ESCC, the FCA has introduced additional listing categories to address the varied needs of issuers, including a dedicated category for shell companies, specifically designed for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs).

4. Why does this matter?

Investor rights are the cornerstone of a healthy and trans­parent financial market. These rights include access to accurate information, protection against undue influence, and the ability to hold corporations accountable for their decisions. Over the years, the U.K. has earned a rep­utation as a global leader in corporate governance and investor protection, supported by a stable regulatory framework and a highly developed financial services sector.

The protection of all investors, including minority share­holders, has been vital in maintaining the attractiveness and integrity of the U.K. markets. Confidence that inves­tors’ rights are protected, together with the high stan­dards inherent in a premium listing, served to lower the cost of capital for companies, and underpinned the U.K.’s attractiveness for raising capital. Central to the U.K.’s listing regime has always been the one-share, one-vote principle, which remains a sacrosanct, central tenet to accepted global corporate governance standards.

5. Back to the future: Governance Groundhog Day?

In 2007, Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC) was allowed to list on the London Stock Exchange with an 18% free float. Six years’ later, the company exited the stock market amidst criticism over its governance and was subsequently investigated by the Serious Fraud Office.

In 2013, under pressure from investors, the FCA updated the listing rules to better protect minority shareholders from companies listing with small free floats. This was to promote market integrity and empower minority share­holders to hold the companies they invest in accountable.

Are we now heading backwards in terms of investor protections?

6. If we build it, will they come?

While it was clear that action was needed to address the decline in IPO activity in London, many institutional investors and their representative bodies have raised concerns that the FCA may have gone too far, risking the erosion of investor protections in an effort to boost market competitiveness. There is also a broader concern that, although the diagnosis of the problem is largely accurate, the jury is still out on the proposed remedies.

There are reasons to be cynical. For example, in an effort to attract Saudi Aramco’s anticipated $2 trillion IPO to London, the FCA implemented significant changes to its listing rules in 2018, but Saudi Aramco ultimately chose to instead list on the Saudi stock exchange.

There are, indeed, many reasons why the U.K. has been unsuccessful in attracting IPOs, particularly from innova­tive and high growth companies, which are unlikely to be addressed by the recent reforms:

• Companies often achieve higher valuations in the U.S., particularly in tech and high-growth sectors. U.K. markets are perceived as more conservative, with investors favouring dividends and profitability over growth potential.

• The U.K.’s departure from the EU reduced its appeal as a gateway to European capital. London is now seen as less central to global finance than it once was.

• Compared to the U.S., the U.K. has a relatively risk-averse investment culture, with less retail participation in IPOs. Pension funds and institutional investors in the U.K. have also shifted away from equities towards bonds and alternative assets.

• Recent high-profile de-listings (e.g., Armaco choosing Nasdaq over LSE) have damaged sentiment. The market is seen by some founders and advisers as in decline, making it a self-reinforcing cycle.

• U.S. markets, with deep capital pools, greater liquidity, and a supportive investor base, are seen as more attractive.

• The LSE is heavily weighted toward traditional sectors (finance, mining, energy) rather than growth and tech industries. This limits peer benchmarking and can discourage tech firms from listing in London.

7. The law of unintended consequences

In a market that was once a beacon of corporate governance, the road ahead for U.K. – and indeed global – governance standards and investor protections now appears uncertain and potentially at risk.

As the U.K. embarks on these listing rule reforms, it could set in motion a potential ‘race to the bottom’ as compe­tition increases amongst jurisdictions seeking to attract new listings. This could result in corporate governance standards and investor protections to be further diluted, not only in the U.K., but globally.

With the demise of the premium listing, which was a prerequisite for index inclusion for many U.K. index providers, there is a risk that companies with alterna­tive governance and voting structures may now appear, unbeknownst, in the portfolios of index fund investors’ portfolios.

Despite earlier hopes of an IPO revival in 2025, signs of a positive turnaround in the U.K. appear premature. Iron­ically, the most high-profile potential listing is also one of the most controversial from a governance perspective. Online fast-fashion giant Shein is now eyeing London after facing pushback from U.S. regulators. This raises a fundamental question: is the drive to reinvigorate the U.K.’s capital markets coming at the expense of gover­nance standards?

Time will tell whether the trade-off between competitive­ness and governance was worth it.

Dr. Summerfield is Pomerantz’s Director of ESG & U.K. Client Services.

Pomerantz Achieves Victory in Litigation Against Avalara

By Tamar A. Weinrib

On March 31, 2025, Pomerantz won a significant victory for investors when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part Judge Pechman’s (W.D. Wa.) ruling dis­missing plaintiff’s Sections 14(a) and 20(a) claims in a securities class action against Avalara, Inc., CEO Scott McFarlane, and the other members of the Avalara Board of Directors. Pomerantz is lead counsel for the class.

Avalara provides cloud-based tax compliance software that automates the routine tax work traditionally per­formed by a company’s tax or legal department. Instead of independently researching tax rules, manually com­puting taxes, and submitting individual checks to numer­ous jurisdictions, Avalara’s customers make a single ACH payment to a single account, and Avalara’s system then handles the tax returns and remittances. Additionally, Avalara is expanding into related business services such as regulatory compliance and e-invoicing.

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (“SAC”) alleges that for well over a year before announcing Avalara’s merger with Vista Equity Partners Management, Avalara’s senior executives publicly conveyed extraordinary op­timism regarding the company’s future potential, which they backed up with hard data. For example, they pro­vided numeric substantiation for their positive statements and touted Avalara’s expected international growth due to diversification of its customer base and government mandates requiring e-invoicing, Avalara’s insulation from macroeconomic risk due to its business model, and its stellar growth and opportunities in upsell bookings. Avalara’s senior management did not voice or even allude to any concerns that Avalara faced any challenges, weaknesses, or likely risks that would negatively impact or in any way stall the company’s exceptional growth in the coming years.

Despite the strength of Avalara’s fundamentals and its consistently stalwart growth from strategic acquisitions, both organically and inorganically, plaintiffs allege that defendants agreed to and subsequently recommended to shareholders a deficient deal price for the merger. The merger share price was depressed from macroeconom­ic trends rather than from the company’s actual robust performance or prospects. In fact, the $93.50 per share price defendants agreed upon with Vista fell 17% below the $109 target price set only a month prior by Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), the financial advisor that issued the fairness opinion for the merger.

To solicit shareholder approval of the inadequate and un­fair price at which it had agreed to sell Avalara to Vista, the Board presented a narrative in the Proxy that was completely inconsistent with Avalara senior manage­ment’s particularized optimistic public statements for the exact same timeframes, and, to a reasonable investor, would appear to describe an entirely different company.

Plaintiffs allege that, to legitimize the artificially depressed projections Avalara provided to financial advisor, Goldman so it could justify the low price Vista paid to Avalara shareholders, the Proxy painted a falsely pessimistic pic­ture of operational challenges and weaknesses, failing partnerships, and decelerating growth. It also included inaccurate revenue projections—which Goldman relied upon in deeming the deficient merger price fair—that did not factor in inorganic growth from M&A activity even though acquisitions had always been a material part of Avalara’s growth story and management made clear that they would continue to be part of the company’s DNA going forward.

The SAC also alleges that defendants issued a mislead­ing Schedule 14A, touting that Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) had recommended the merger but omit­ting that the ISS explicitly stated that its recommendation was cautionary and made clear that it found scathing crit­icism of the deal by several large investors to be credible.

The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ case against Ava­lara, ruling that the SAC had not alleged objective falsity as to any of defendants’ misstatements. The court based its ruling on, among other things, inferences drawn in defendants’ favor, resolutions of questions of fact that should not have been addressed at the pleading stage, and findings of “puffery”—vague, optimistic statements that a reasonable investor would not rely on when mak­ing investment decisions—even though each alleged misstatement included or accompanied hard metrics.

The district court also ruled that the SAC had not alleged subjective falsity or negligence as to any defendant except for CEO defendant McFarlane. However, the court conceded that the SAC had plausibly alleged that McFarlane had transmitted all the same data he pos­sessed, which underpinned the finding of subjective falsity as to him, to the other director defendants during nine separate meetings.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling in part. It found that the district court had erred in ruling that the omission of inorganic growth from the projec­tions was not objectively false or misleading because the SAC claimed that “acquisitions have always been a material part of Avalara’s growth story and management made clear that they would continue to be a part of the Company’s DNA going forward;” the SAC “underscore[d] how Avalara had always included inorganic growth in its guidance, and when it did not, it “explicitly stated as such;”” and the SAC included “uncontested allegations that Avalara acquired “twenty eight companies from 2007 to 2021, including twelve between 2018 to 2021.” The Court stated that the “plethora of particularized allega­tions plausibly suggests that the omission—and the lack of notice about such omission—could materially mislead a reasonable investor.” The Ninth Circuit concluded that “Requiring more detail than those presently al­leged would transform the PSLRA’s formidable pleading requirement into an impossible one.”

The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court had erred in holding that statements about the ISS recom­mendation were not objectively false and misleading because defendants had omitted numerous statements from the ISS report demonstrating “that ISS’s recom­mendation was not as approbatory as Avalara touted. ... Indeed, it was “cautionary.” The Ninth Circuit rejected defendants’ argument that certain of the unfavorable ex­cerpts had been included in a separate SEC filing by a third party because “Ordinarily, omissions by corporate insiders are not rendered immaterial by the fact that the omitted facts are otherwise available to the public.”” The Court further rejected defendants’ argument that it is true that ISS did in fact issue a recommendation for the sale because “statements literally true on their face may nonetheless be misleading when considered in context.”

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that the district court’s “meticulous analysis” was correct that the PLSRA safe harbor does not apply to statements regarding the preparation of the projections because “statements that the projections were “prepared on a reasonable basis” or “reflected the best currently available estimates and judgments” are “not forward looking.” They are instead statements about the preparation of, and basis for, the pro­jections that incorporated then existing, verifiable facts.”

Pomerantz continues to vigorously pursue plaintiffs’ securities claims against Avalara.

Q&A with Partner Brenda Szydlo

By Katarina Marcial

Editor Katarina Marcial sat down with Brenda Szydlo, a Partner in Pomerantz’s New York office, to discuss her career journey, passion for mentorship, and advice for lawyers looking to make their mark in the field.

Monitor: Can you share a little about your background and interests?

Brenda Szydlo: I grew up in Brooklyn and moved to Long Island, where I now live. I attended Binghamton University as an undergraduate and earned a law degree at St. John’s School of Law. I have known I wanted to be a lawyer since the age of ten, and I have consistently followed that path, making choices to achieve that goal. I gained experience early on at mid-sized to giant firms representing both plaintiffs and defendants in complex civil litigation in federal and state courts. After spending much of my career in New York Big Law defense firms, I truly enjoy representing plaintiffs at Pomerantz.

Monitor: What brought you to Pomerantz, and what do you enjoy most about being a Partner here?

Brenda Szydlo: I came to Pomerantz when an opportunity arose to work on a securities class action against Brazil’s largest oil company, Petrobras, in which Pomerantz was Lead Counsel and which was heading to trial. The allegations stemmed from a multi-billion-dollar, decades-long kickback and bribery scheme. I was hired, as Senior Counsel, to play a leading role in the case. After several years of hard-fought litigation, we secured a historic $3 billion settlement for the class. I enjoyed taking fact and expert depositions and the writing opportunities. Our use of jury focus groups, which enabled our trial team to gain insight into jury reasoning and analysis, was fascinating. The entire experience was very rewarding. I chose to stay at Pomerantz and became a Partner, running my own cases and mentoring other attorneys.

I have never been as happy at a law firm as I am at Pomerantz. I have deep re­spect for the attorneys at the firm. I appreciate the work culture at Pomerantz: a high level of intelligence, expertise and professionalism within a supportive, collaborative atmosphere. I can bounce ideas off my colleagues for a fresh perspective on my cases, and there is camaraderie here that I appreciate. That’s important, considering how much time attorneys spend working together in the office.

Monitor: Why is mentorship important to you?

Brenda Szydlo: My first job out of law school was at a mid-sized firm that handled various areas of litigation, including securities litigation. A senior partner asked me to work with him to defend a major accounting firm in two high-profile cases involving securities fraud and other wrongdoing with respect to companies controlled by automobile magnate John DeLorean. Depositions were obtained from secretaries and ministers of state, including former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, along with unprecedented discovery of documents from the British government, including secret cabinet

minutes. That senior partner became my mentor. His guidance helped me greatly, and throughout my career, I have wanted to pay it forward to the next group of young attorneys, as he did for me. Mentoring is a great and rewarding bonding experience, helping someone hone their skills and gain new experiences to grow as an attorney.

Monitor: Can you identify any ways that mentorship helped you?

Brenda Szydlo: Yes. Because I had a mentor, I was able to take depositions early in my career. In fact, I wish my mentor had been with me the first time I took a deposition. I recall being in the room with well-seasoned attorneys from two large firms and having to learn on the fly. Back then, there was no time limit for depositions, and this one dragged on well into the evening. Now, had my mentor been with me, I would have had the wisdom to say, “Oh no, we’re cutting this off at six o’clock and we’ll regroup on another day.” Though he was not physically by my side during that first deposition, I was given the opportunity to take a deposition as a junior associate because of him. I am thankful for the opportunities and valuable lessons he gave me.

Monitor: Can you share your mentoring experience at Pomerantz?

Brenda Szydlo: One of my first mentees here was associate Villi Shteyn. He joined the firm directly out of law school. I exposed him to depositions -- how to take them and how to handle witnesses. After he shadowed me on depositions, I had him draft an outline to depose three doctors for a case. How you phrase questions in a deposition is very important. If not properly phrased, a question can evoke an objection by the other side. We refined his questions together and then he took the three depositions. I sat in and observed, passing him notes to help him through the proceedings, but he conducted them. My goal is to prepare attorneys to lead cases on their own and to give them as many opportunities as possible.

Monitor: What qualities make a good mentor?

Brenda Szydlo: It’s important to be mindful of the skills the mentee wants to learn and work together with them to find a way of getting there. Why not expose the person if you can? Also, building trust with mentees so that they feel comfortable enough to speak to you about issues they are facing is key. My door is always open to any mentee who wants to confer about cases. Sharing stories is a helpful way to pass down wisdom. Hearing stories of your experiences, and the lessons that you learned from them, can be valuable.

Monitor: Do you have advice for associates looking to grow their careers?

Brenda Szydlo: Ask for opportunities. Make it known that you want certain experience and are eager to learn. For example, because I know that Dean Ferrogari, another associate, wants to participate in more discovery, I am looking for those opportunities for him. Associates just need to speak up.

Plaintiffs Defeat Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Axsome Therapeutics

By Michael Grunfeld

On March 31, 2025, Pomerantz secured a victory on behalf of a proposed class of investors in Axsome Therapeutics, Inc., defeating defendants’ motion to dismiss securities fraud claims related to Axsome’s New Drug Application (“NDA”) for one of its core products, AXS-07.

Axsome is a small pharmaceutical company that develops therapies for central nervous system disorders. AXS-07, a migraine medication, was one of the company’s two main products and the one that it represented as clos­est to commercialization during the period from May 10, 2021 to April 22, 2022 (the “Class Period”).

Plaintiffs allege in their Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) that throughout the Class Period, Axsome and its senior executives misrepresented the compa­ny’s ability to manufacture AXS-07 and the strength of its NDA that was required for the drug to be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Then, on April 25, 2022, Axsome announced that it expected that the FDA would not approve the AXS-07 NDA because of “unresolved” issues with chemistry, manufacturing and controls (“CMC”), sending Axsome’s stock price plum­meting by 22% and causing its investors to suffer signifi­cant financial losses.

The Complaint supported the allegation that defendants misrepresented the status of AXS-07 and its NDA sub­mission based on several sources, including a confi­dential witness who worked on a study of AXS-07 and reported that Axsome’s third-party contract manufac­turing organization (“CMO”) was completely unable to manufacture the drug during the Class Period because of equipment problems at the manufacturer. Plaintiffs also cited defendants’ subsequent admissions, when discussing their resubmission of the NDA after the Class Period, that Axsome still needed to manufacture additional batches of AXS-07 for certain studies that were needed for the submission.

The court upheld nearly all of the alleged misstatements in the Complaint and held that scienter — defendants’ intent — was adequately alleged as to two of the individ­ual defendants, Axsome’s CEO and its Chief Operating Officer, as well as for the company itself. The Complaint thus adequately alleges claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against these defendants.

There are several notable aspects of the court’s deci­sion denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, including its rejection of defendants’ arguments concerning the elements of falsity, scienter, and loss causation.

Falsity

Even with strong allegations that Axsome experienced the manufacturing problems with AXS-07 alleged in the Complaint, plaintiffs had to overcome defendants’ argu­ments that their statements would not have misled inves­tors about the status of AXS-07 and its NDA submission.

The court rejected defendants’ arguments, holding that their “statements about AXS-07 were misleading be­cause they created an impression that the Company was not facing supply issues, when, in reality, the [Com­plaint] alleges that Axsome was unable to produce sufficient AXS-07 for at least a year” and that statements about the NDA submission “were misleading because they implied that Axsome actually was conducting, or at least was able to conduct, stability testing” when in fact “Axsome could not obtain sufficient AXS-07 to conduct the necessary stability studies,” which “would result in an inadequate NDA filing.”

The court therefore rejected nearly all of defendants’ argu­ments that their alleged misstatements were nonactionable opinion statements, were otherwise not material (or signifi­cant) to investors, or were not inconsistent with the under­lying facts alleged. Rather, the allegations in the Complaint “support the inference that Axsome was experiencing man­ufacturing and supplier issues that Defendants were obli­gated to disclose to make other statements not misleading.” The court also agreed with plaintiffs that Axsome’s alleged equipment problems were material to investors since they “impacted the likelihood of NDA approval because they were delaying AXS-07’s stability testing timeline.”

In addition, the court held that defendants’ purportedly for-ward-looking statements were not protected by a safe harbor for such statements because when these statements were made, Axsome was “already facing supply issues that were delaying ‘the development and commercialization’ of AXS-07,” the Complaint adequately alleged “actual knowl­edge” of falsity, and the safe harbor “does not protect material omissions.”

More fundamentally, the court agreed with plaintiffs’ theory of falsity, holding that the Complaint was not alleging “that Defendants ‘promise[d]’ FDA approval, but instead that Defendants ‘promote[d] the likely approval of AXS-07’ while being aware of facts that materially decreased the likelihood of such approval.” This ruling shows that defendants cannot evade liability by contending that they cannot predict the future when their positive statements are inconsistent with the underlying facts that they are aware of at the time that reduce the probability of a positive outcome for the company.

Scienter

The court’s scienter ruling helpfully shows how several different scienter allegations “taken together” can plead the requisite showing of intent, that a confidential witness’s “information need not be based on direct contact with the Individual Defendants to be reliable,” and that post-Class Period statements can support inferences about defendants’ state of mind during the Class Period.

In particular, the Complaint adequately alleges the scienter of Axsome’s CEO and COO — and by extension, of Axsome itself — because AXS-07 was a “core product” for Axsome, which “is a small pharmaceutical company with only about 100 full-time employees as of early 2022”; these defendants’ “public statements evinced a strong familiarity with AXS-07’s manufacturing process”; an FDA inspection report related to Axsome’s other main product described these defendants’ responsibilities for the relevant functions at the company; the confidential witness reported to the COO’s report; and defendants’ post-Class Period statements “ illustrate that Defendants knew that AXS-07’s June 2021 NDA would likely be defi­cient due to supply delays that limited stability testing.”

In other words, plaintiffs may adequately plead the defendants’ scienter based on the circumstances as a whole. The court will not accept the defendants’ alternative explanation of events when a commonsense interpretation of the relevant information dictates that individual defen­dants, such as a company’s top executives responsible for the topic at issue, knew or recklessly disregarded the underlying facts that made their statements false and misleading to investors.

Loss Causation

The court also ruled that the Complaint adequately alleges loss causation — i.e., that that defendants’ misstatements caused plaintiffs’ losses. This ruling also confirms the importance of common sense in interpreting the course of events.

In their motion to dismiss, defendants attempted to argue that loss causation was not adequately alleged because the Complaint did not sufficiently “allege that the basis for the FDA’s denial of the NDA was Axsome’s inability to manufacture AXS-07.” The court rejected this argument because even though Axsome did not disclose the specific CMC issues that caused the FDA to reject the NDA for AXS-07, the “allegations give rise to the reasonable inference that the CMC issues to which the FDA referred [when rejecting the NDA for AXS-07] were the manufacturing issues described throughout” the Complaint and the Complaint “alleges that undisclosed manufacturing issues created a particular risk that the FDA would reject the AXS-07 NDA.”

Here too, as with the Court’s earlier rulings, plaintiffs prevailed because their interpretation of the available information was far more reasonable than defendants’ attempt to avoid liability through a farfetched reading of those events.

The case is In re Axsome Therapeutics, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-3925 (S.D.N.Y.)

Pomerantz $40 Million Emergent Biosolutions Settlement Granted Final Approval

By the Editors

Pomerantz was pleased to recently resolve its securities class action lawsuit against Emergent BioSolutions Inc. (NYSE: EBS) and certain of its executives, which sought to recover investment losses stemming from alleged misrepresentations of the markets relating to Emergent’s disastrous COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing failures. After four years of hard-fought litigation led by Pomerantz Partner Matthew Tuccillo, the court granted final approval to the $40 million class-wide settlement in late February 2025.

When the COVID-19 pandemic struck, Emergent seemed uniquely positioned to capitalize, as the U.S. government had designated Emergent’s Bayview facility in Baltimore, Maryland, as one of just three in the U.S. pre-authorized to ensure a supply of vaccines in a pandemic. In short order, Emergent signed over $1 billion in contracts with the U.S. government, Johnson & Johnson, and AstraZeneca to manufacture the raw material – bulk drug substance – for the two companies’ COVID-19 vaccines, which, due to simpler dosing and refrigeration needs than mRNA alternatives, were poised to be a significant element of the U.S. global response to the pandemic.

Unbeknownst to investors, Emergent’s Bayview facility had serious, longstanding deficiencies in equipment, personnel, training, and processes, particularly in regards to its anti-contamination capabilities, which materially increased the risks of catastrophic errors that could derail its COVID-19 manufacturing work. These flaws, which rendered the Bayview facility unsuited for the urgent COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing role, were later revealed by The New York Times and the Associated Press, multiple Congressional reports, and Pomerantz’s interviews of numerous former employees and review of extensive regulatory documentation.

Contrary to these concealed, negative facts, during the class period at issue, Emergent and its executives touted Bayview’s readiness to rapidly engage in large-scale manufacturing of both the J&J and AstraZeneca COVID- 19 vaccine bulk drug substances. Emergent raised funds via a public offering, while its CEO revised his Rule 10b5-1 stock trading plan, which had not sold a single share in four years, to sell over 88,000 shares in a three-week period near class period high trading prices, reaping him over $11 million in sales during the alleged fraud. When The New York Times reported that Emergent had cross-contaminated a batch of J&J bulk drug substance with AstraZeneca material, Emergent and its CEO initially denied that any cross-contamination had occurred.

Ensuing revelations of incidents where deficient procedures, insufficient training, and lack of compliance at Bayview resulted in batches of J&J or AstraZeneca bulk drug substance being discarded due to bacterial or other contamination, suffocation of cells, and other failures caused Emergent’s stock price to plummet. The U.S. government halted production of the AstraZeneca vaccine at Bayview and handed control of the facility to J&J before finally ending all COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing there, as Emergent’s lucrative contracts were terminated. Ultimately, Emergent’s failures resulted in the destruction of 400 million out of the 500 million COVID-19 vaccine dose-equivalents ever produced at the Bayview facility, a stunning failure. Investors suffered huge losses.

Pomerantz’s clients, the Nova Scotia Health Employees’ Pension Plan and the City of Fort Lauderdale Police & Firefighters’ Retirement System, were appointed Co-Lead Plaintiffs to oversee this important litigation. Under their oversight, Pomerantz pled a robust amended complaint, supplemented by extensive judicial notice materials, that synthesized a sweeping factual record into a compelling securities fraud narrative.

Pomerantz litigated and overcame a hard-fought, voluminous motion to dismiss after a lengthy oral argument. Thereafter, Pomerantz zealously built the evidentiary record by pursuing written and document discovery from defendants, subpoenaing third parties like J&J and AstraZeneca and serving records requests (FOIA and international equivalents) to U.S. and foreign regulators. Pomerantz secured and reviewed nearly 120,000 documents and deposed a dozen Emergent executives and employees. Pomerantz also filed a motion for class certification, supported by an expert report on market efficiency and damages, which the court granted.

Meanwhile, as authorized by our clients, Pomerantz also pursued a negotiated resolution, mindful of Emergent’s troubled operations and ongoing concern warnings in its SEC filings. Pomerantz conducted a full-day, in-person mediation and a follow-up virtual session with an experienced JAMS mediator. Thereafter, Pomerantz engaged in six months of regular telephonic negotiations while advancing discovery before an agreement in principle to settle was reached. After the court granted preliminary settlement approval, Pomerantz oversaw a robust, class-wide notice program, which resulted in over 130,000 mailed notices, 27,000 settlement webpage visits, and 64,000 class member claims submitted – without a single class member objecting to any part of the settlement. The overwhelmingly positive response is not surprising. The settlement represented a recovery as high as 12.75% of class-wide damages and compared extremely favorably both to comparable settlements within the judicial Circuit and to national settlements data from 2014-2023 as compiled by NERA and Cornerstone Research.

Asked for comment, Attorney Tuccillo said: “We are so pleased that the court granted final approval of this important settlement. Judge Boardman ordered a brisk litigation schedule, carefully oversaw our progress, and closely scrutinized our settlement. The settlement is an outstanding result and secured the vast majority of available insurance coverage for the benefit of Emergent’s damaged shareholders. Credit goes to our clients, who produced documents, oversaw our work and authorized a strong settlement for the benefit of the entire class.” Pomerantz is now working with a claims administrator to efficiently process and validate the submitted class member claims and looks forward to filing a distribution motion to seek court approval to send recovery checks later this year.

Pomerantz’s litigation team on the Emergent matter also included Of Counsel Jennifer Banner Sobers and Associates Zachary Denver, Jessica Dell, Villi Shteyn, and Brandon Cordovi.

Pomerantz Prevails Against Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Alphabet and Google

By the Editors

On March 24, 2025, U.S. District Judge Rita F. Lin of the Northern District of California sustained investors’ securities fraud claims against Alphabet and Google in a high-profile litigation that involves allegedly false and misleading statements made by Google to investors concerning Google’s digital advertising technology. Google’s allegedly improper practices are the subject of several lawsuits alleging antitrust violations by the Attorneys General of two dozen states and the Department of Justice. Pomerantz serves as sole lead counsel in the litigation.

Alphabet’s subsidiary Google is the dominant player in the field of digital advertising. According to plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, “Google’s dominance in the entire ad tech industry has been questioned by its own digital advertising executives, at least one of whom aptly asked: “[I]s there a deeper issue with us owning the platform, the exchange, and a huge network? The analogy would be if Goldman or Citibank owned the NYSE.””

The ABCs of Digital Advertising

Display ads are image-based ads on websites, which may contain images, text or multimedia. A single display ad shown to a single user on a single occasion is an impression. A website’s owner or an online media company is a publisher. Publishers of news articles usually monetize their content with targeted display ads shown alongside the article. Internet advertisers may include businesses, government agencies, charities, political candidates, and other entities.

Online publishers sell their inventory of display ads to advertisers either directly or indirectly. For example, The New York Times, as an online publisher, could negotiate directly with Apple, as an advertiser, to display Apple’s ads atop the NYT homepage one million times in a particular month. However, a publisher cannot always predict how many of its ad spaces will be available to sell directly to advertisers because its inventory depends on how many users visit its website. Publishers can, therefore, find themselves with unsold, surplus inventory.

Publishers use software known as an ad server to make their impressions available for sale. Since 2008, Google has owned the industry’s leading ad server, Google Ad Manager (GAM), which is often still referred to by its former name, DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP).

Indirect sales occur through centralized electronic trading hubs, or ad exchanges (a/k/a supply-side platforms or SSPs) and through networks of publishers and advertisers. Publishers can use an ad exchange to auction off some or all of their inventory to buyers in real time for a percentage fee, or sell their inventory to a network, which in turn will resell it to an advertiser for an undisclosed markup. Google owns the industry’s leading ad exchange, Google AdX, now packaged with DFP as part of GAM. GAM currently controls over 90 percent of the digital advertising market in the United States.

In 2000, Google launched Google Ads, a tool that allowed businesses to buy ads that would be seen by Google search users alongside their search engine results. Advertisers, drawn by the power of such instantaneous, highly targeted advertising, flocked to Google Ads.

Unbeknownst to Investors, Google Favors Itself

Google began requiring publishers who chose to use Google Ads to also use its ad server DFP and its ad exchange AdX. Google did not disclose that it programmed DFP to give Google’s own ad exchange, AdX, the first chance to buy impressions before they were offered to other ad exchanges, and often to do so at artificially low prices.

Google then profited by charging high fees on AdX, while neither advertisers nor publishers could leave for other ad exchanges, having no access to one another. Publishers fought back with “header bidding,” which involved inserting code into their webpages that allowed other non-Google ad exchanges to bid on their impressions before Google’s hard-coded preference for AdX was triggered. Google saw header bidding as a major threat to its digital advertising dominance.

Pomerantz’s complaint alleges that even before header bidding emerged, Google had singled out Facebook— one of the biggest ad buyers on the internet—as a competitive threat. In March 2017, Facebook announced that its Facebook Advertising Network (FAN) would participate in header bidding, permitting its advertisers to bypass Google’s platform and chipping away at its revenues. Crushing the “existential threat” posed by header bidding and Facebook became a major priority for Google. Securing Facebook’s participation in Google’s open bidding system was so critical that Pichai personally negotiated a deal to convince Facebook to abandon header bidding. Enticing Facebook required significant concessions, with Google agreeing to give Facebook the same benefits it maintained over other bidding participants. Those perks included additional time to bid for ads, auction matching advantages, the ability to detect which impressions were targeted to bots, and a predetermined “win rate.”

Pomerantz and Plaintiffs Prevail

Judge Lin found that Pomerantz adequately alleged that the advertising auctions favored bids submitted through Google-owned platforms or FAN, which had an agreement with Google:

“Allegedly, bidders operating through those channels received extra time, additional nonpublic information, and other advantages. Plaintiffs have further adequately alleged that Pichai was sufficiently involved in the negotiation regarding FAN that he was well-aware of these advantages when he represented otherwise in his September 2020 statement.”

According to Partner Emma Gilmore, who co-leads the litigation with Jeremy A. Lieberman, “The court sustained plaintiffs’ claim that CEO Pichai made a false representation to Congress with the intent to deceive the market when he testified that “the channel through which a bid is received does not otherwise affect the determination of the winning bidder.” This is a significant win for investors, paving the way for them to recoup their losses in Google, an advertising juggernaut.”

Q&A with Of Counsel Samantha Daniels

By Katarina Marcial

Editor Katarina Marcial chatted with Of Counsel Samantha Daniels, based in the Firm’s New York office.

Monitor: Can you share a little about your background and interests?

Samantha Daniels: I grew up in Daytona Beach, Florida, known for its lively spring break scene, NASCAR, and Bike Week. Aspiring to be a lawyer, I attended Cornell in Ithaca as an undergrad and the University of Chicago for law school, and even¬tually worked in Washington, DC at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher as an associate. After stints in Gibson’s DC, LA, and NY offices, I finally found my home in NYC. Disillu¬sioned by working for the defense side (solely for large corporations), I realized I wanted to represent those who would hold those corporations accountable. I did not want to sacrifice the quality of the people and work product I became accustomed to at Gibson, and Pomerantz fit the bill.

I love ‘70s, ‘80s, and ‘90s rock, funk, and soul. I also enjoy art, visiting museums and painting. Taking painting classes is my way of relaxing, clearing my mind, and gaining inspiration.

Monitor: What inspired you to pursue a career in law, particularly in securities litigation?

Samantha Daniels: My dad is a lawyer, which inspired my respect for the profes¬sion, especially securities law. I studied political science and history to prepare for a career in DC politics or a government agency. But my experience in DC left me jaded. At Gibson’s appellate group, I discovered a passion for storytelling. In securities law, storytelling is essential for presenting facts in a compelling manner to engage judges. I worked with inspiring colleagues, such as the late, great Ted Olson, who taught me how to make judges care about a case by highlighting its public policy implications. I enjoy using my storytelling skills – finding the right angle and packaging it well – to highlight wrongdoing and the harm it’s caused, as the key to crafting a narrative that resonates with judges. I love this aspect of litigation.

Monitor: You recently successfully overcame two Motions to Dismiss. Can you tell us about the cases?

Samantha Daniels: The case against Golden Heaven involved clear-cut fraud by a Chinese company that went public in the U.S., falsely claiming high demand and revenue for its amusement parks. Upon investigation by Hindenburg (and confirmed by our own investigator abroad), it was discovered that the parks were virtually deserted. The hearing for defendants’ motion to dismiss went well, and we felt confident we would win. However, before the judge issued a decision on the case, the Slack decision (Pirani v. Slack Techs., Inc.) was handed down in the Ninth Circuit, which could have severely limited Pomerantz’s case. The Slack decision essentially stated that if plaintiffs can’t trace their shares directly to the IPO’s registration statement, then there is no standing for their claims. The Golden Heaven defendants cited that decision as a reason to dismiss our case. I argued, however, that this was dicta -- in other words, that the judge’s statements in the Slack decision were not binding as precedent -- and the judge, already convinced by my argument about the severity of the fraud, agreed that Slack didn’t apply. Consequently, the judge denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss our case, which was a significant victory.

The SunPower case involved more subtle deception by a reputable U.S.-based solar company. We alleged that SunPower misled investors about its financial health and capabilities while secretly approaching bankruptcy. SunPower was delaying the release of its financials, relying on future cash it would receive from a majority shareholder. Behind the scenes, it was in a cash freefall. The challenge was to demonstrate this pattern of deceit to Judge Rita Lin and to secure confidential witnesses who would attest to SunPower’s lack of cash flow. Despite rigorous counterarguments from opposing counsel, the judge recognized the fraudulent implications of SunPower’s actions. Although not all our claims were upheld, enough were maintained to allow us to proceed. This case posed the challenge of proving fraud without concrete financial disclosures. However, I ultimately established a pattern of wrongdoing and advanced the case.

Monitor: Do you feel that there is an unspoken expectation for women in law to do it all, excel at their careers, while finding balance?

Samantha Daniels: Yes, I do. I balance these expectations with confidence by maintaining my boundaries and addressing issues head-on. For example, I recently had to work on a case with another firm. They sent me an incomplete draft of the complaint, despite our agreement that they’d handle the complaint and I’d handle the opposition. Instead of fixing their draft, I pushed back and sent a strongly worded email with corrections, emphasizing my deadlines and their responsibilities. Sometimes, people will test what they can get away with, and it’s essential to stand up for oneself, especially for women, who often feel pressured to do it all. In your personal life, you can do the same thing. Once you recognize your worth, this becomes a lot easier.

Monitor: Do you have any female mentors or role models who have shaped your career?

Samantha Daniels: During my time at Gibson in DC, Helgi Walker, an appellate partner, involved me in cases with intriguing constitutional issues, emphasizing the importance of argument and presentation and understanding judges’ perspectives. Her mentorship taught me to embrace ambiguity, present it clearly, and act as a PR agent when defending a corporation, crafting a well-researched argument that considers all stakeholders. Similarly, working with Perlette Jura in Los Angeles was invaluable due to her extensive experience in appellate and transnational litigation. She shared with me a memorable story about leading a meeting as a female associate in a room full of men. Despite knowing that beautiful young women are not always taken seriously, she had confidence in her case knowledge and owned her power. This continues to inspire me. At Pomerantz, I am grateful to be managing my own cases, gaining confidence and confirmation of something I already knew – I can do this. I am fortunate to work with highly accomplished women like Emma Gilmore, Murielle Steven Walsh and Brenda Szydlo and learn from them all.

Monitor: What advice would you offer to younger attorneys seeking to succeed in their careers?

Samantha Daniels: Always speak up. If you have a great idea, or if you see a legal route that hasn’t been pursued, or a legal theory or argument, share it. As a junior associate, I recall hesitating to voice my thoughts, assuming others had already considered my ideas or doubting them due to potential counterarguments. However, your strength comes from being closest to the facts and law, especially when preparing partners for hearings or drafting briefs. If you see something, say something.

Pomerantz Secures Landmark Governance Reforms in Qurate Retail Settlement

 By Gustavo F. Bruckner and Danielle Sharon

On December 6, 2024, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III of the Delaware Court of Chancery granted final approval to a groundbreaking settlement in In re Qurate Retail, Inc. Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 2021-1116-SG (Del. Ch.). This stockholder derivative action, brought on behalf of Qurate Retail, Inc., alleged that certain senior executives and board members engaged in self-dealing transactions that benefited company insiders at the expense of stock­holders. Pomerantz, serving as Co-Counsel, helped ne­gotiate a settlement that implements critical governance reforms designed to restore corporate accountability at Qurate.

Class action securities litigations are brought by stockhold­ers on behalf of a group, or “class,” of similarly defrauded investors and usually seek recovery of financial losses due to fraud. They often result in direct monetary compen­sation for stockholders. Stockholder derivative actions, on the other hand, are brought on behalf of the corpora­tion by stockholders against the directors of a corporation for the benefit of the corporation and its stockholders in order to remedy a harm to the corporation. Often, these suits seek to compel changes in corporate governance. The Qurate case aimed to rectify structural governance failures that allowed insiders to extract unfair benefits. The settlement delivered significant corporate governance changes, including the reinstatement of a critical call right that Qurate’s predecessor had originally paid $150 million for in 1998, along with new safeguards against unchecked insider control. These reforms will provide lasting benefits to the company and its investors, ensuring greater oversight and preventing similar issues in the future.

What Makes This Case Unique

The case centered around a rare and impactful series of transactions that raised fundamental questions about the corporate governance of Qurate, a leading multi-platform retailer. Specifically, it involved the controversial 2021 transactions between Qurate senior executives, Gregory B. Maffei, CEO and President, and Dr. John C. Malone, a controlling stockholder, which effectively consolidated control of the company in the hands of insiders by strip­ping Qurate of a crucial call right that had been acquired for $150 million in 1998. This eliminated Qurate’s ability to reclaim control of shares, representing a major shift in corporate control dynamics.

What attracted Pomerantz to the case was the opportunity to challenge this blatant conflict of interest and restore fundamental governance mechanisms that protect stockholders. The case was also emblematic of broader corporate governance concerns, particularly in companies with dual-class stock structures where insiders have disproportionate control, leaving public stockholders at a disadvantage. The case offered a significant opportunity not only to seek justice for stockholders but also to establish important reforms that would serve as a model for good governance.

Understanding Derivative Suits and Books and Records Demands

A derivative lawsuit is brought by a stockholder on behalf of a corporation against its executives, board members, or other insiders when they have allegedly engaged in misconduct that harms the company. These cases seek remedies that benefit the company directly when its board of directors fails to take appropriate action to address alleged wrongdoing.

Before filing a derivative suit, stockholders frequently issue a books and records demand, a legal request under most states’ laws that grants stockholders the right to inspect certain internal corporate documents to investigate potential misconduct. In this case, stockholders obtained valuable internal documents that strengthened their claims against Qurate’s leadership.

The Case: How Pomerantz Took Action

Pomerantz pursued this case after uncovering a series of transactions that raised serious concerns about cor¬porate governance at Qurate. The litigation focused on a 2021 transaction in which Malone, Qurate’s controlling stockholder, transferred his super-voting Series B shares to his long-time business associate, Maffei. This move, plaintiffs alleged, was orchestrated to consolidate control in the hands of insiders and effectively deprived Qurate of the ability to reclaim those shares through an existing call right. Specifically, the 2021 transaction involving Qurate triggered an accelerated vesting of Maffei’s options under his employment agreement, which would have provided him with substantial benefits unavailable to other stock¬holders.

The complaint alleged that these transactions:

• Eliminated a Valuable Corporate Right – Qurate’s predecessor had paid $150 million in 1998 for the ability to repurchase the controlling Series B shares under certain conditions. The 2021 transactions stripped Qurate of this right without adequate stockholder consideration.

• Benefited Insiders at the Expense of Stockholders – The transfer of control from Malone to Maffei did not provide any benefit to the company or its investors but instead entrenched management’s authority and en¬riched Maffei.

• Violated Fiduciary Duties – By approving and facilitat¬ing these transactions, certain Qurate board members breached their fiduciary duties by prioritizing insider interests over those of public stockholders.

Procedural History: A Complex and Hard-Fought Case

After making a books and records request and reviewing confidential internal documents, the action was initiated on December 28, 2021, when plaintiffs filed a derivative complaint on behalf of Qurate in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

• Motion to Dismiss Granted in Part and Denied in Part – Defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the board’s actions were legally permissible. While the Court dismissed claims against certain directors who were found not to have been directly involved in the alleged misconduct, it upheld the claims against the key figures, including Malone and Maffei, ruling that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged breaches of fiduciary duty as to those directors.

• Demand Futility Argument – In derivative suits, plain¬tiffs must typically demonstrate demand futility, meaning they must show that asking the company’s board for per¬mission to take action would have been pointless be¬cause members of the board were likely conflicted. One particularly unusual but helpful development in the case was the appearance of a photo on social media depict¬ing Malone on a private cruise alongside a purportedly uninterested board member. This evidence played a pivotal role in establishing demand futility, as it visually demonstrated the influence of conflicted insiders over the board. The image provided tangible proof that key decision-makers were not independent, further sup¬porting claims that insiders improperly influenced the transactions. This allowed the case to proceed without requiring plaintiffs to first seek board permission before taking action.

• Extensive Discovery and Negotiations – Over the course of litigation, Pomerantz engaged in rigorous discovery, uncovering key evidence that supported the claims of self-dealing and improper governance. This included obtaining internal communications, board meeting minutes and financial records that demonstrated the potential conflicts of interest inherent in the transactions.

The Settlement: Major Wins for Stockholders

The settlement delivered meaningful governance reforms to protect Qurate’s stockholders and ensure that similar improper interested transactions do not occur in the future.

Key settlement terms include:

• Restoration of the Call Right

1. Qurate successfully reinstated a call right over Maffei’s Series B shares, ensuring the company has a mechanism to reclaim control in certain circumstances.

2. The new call right closely mirrors the original 1998 agreement, allowing Qurate to recapture these shares under defined conditions.

3. This provision restores balance to Qurate’s corporate structure, preventing insiders from consolidating excessive control.

• Independent Oversight of Insider Transactions

4. Future material transactions involving Malone or Maffei must be reviewed and approved by an independent board committee.

5. This ensures that stockholder interests are prioritized over insider benefits and enhances overall corporate transparency.

Board Composition Reform

6. Malone agreed not to seek reelection after his term ends in 2025,

which alleviates concerns about concentrated control and potential conflicts of interest.

7. This reform reduces the likelihood of corporate decisions being

unduly influenced by a single controlling stockholder.

These reforms, while non-monetary, are significant governance changes, ensuring a more equitable decision-making process for all Qurate stockholders.

Court Commentary on the Settlement

Vice Chancellor Glasscock praised the settlement, stating:

• “The chances of a really lucrative cash award after trial were limited, and so it appears to me to be not only fair, but a very commendable settlement.”

• “These [therapeutic benefits] are so neatly tailored to the situation that brought us all here that I have got to congratulate the parties for coming up with them.”

Pomerantz’s Commitment to Stockholders

Pomerantz’s Corporate Governance team has long been at the forefront of stockholder rights litigation, advocating for corporate accountability and transparency.

The Qurate settlement establishes a precedent for corporate governance reforms in similar cases. The requirement that insider transactions undergo independent scrutiny is an essential safeguard, ensuring that public companies remain accountable to all stockholders, not just controlling insiders.

Q&A with Associate Ankita Sangwan

By Katarina Marcial

Editor Katarina Marcial chatted with Associate Ankita Sangwan, a member of the Firm’s Corporate Governance Team in its New York office, to learn about her career journey, the motivations behind her pursuit of corporate governance, her most rewarding case, and what advice she has for aspiring lawyers.

Monitor: Can you share a little about your background and interests?

Ankita Sangwan: I grew up in multiple cities across India, as my dad was in the military. I attended law school there. During the pandemic, I decided to pursue my master’s degree and applied to universities across the globe. I was accepted at Columbia, which brought me to New York. As for my interests, I enjoy reading science fiction and dystopian novels. I was a fan of “Dune” before it gained widespread popularity. I’m also conscious of health, nutrition and fitness, and I enjoy hiking and Pilates on the weekends.

Monitor: Was it challenging to transition to a new country and assimilate to a new work environment, customs, and differences in the legal fields?

Ankita Sangwan: Graduate school was not particularly difficult. Fortunately, I did not face many challenges adapting. The teaching methods at my master’s program were similar to those we had at my law school in India, which made the transition smooth. Naturally, there were cultural differences that required me to step out of my comfort zone when I first met people. In Columbia’s masters program, we had students from around the world. It helped to have many people trying to assimilate together, which facilitated a good support system for me. Overall, the experience was new and exciting. Starting in a new place can be daunting, particularly when making friends in a new city. However, once I overcame my initial nerves, it was a great experience. Starting at any new workplace is always different, and because I worked at a law firm in India for around four years, I had to adjust to the differences in the U.S. legal system. The biggest difference was that the U.S. has a parallel court system at the state and federal levels. They don’t have that in India. I had to get used to different procedures and ways of doing certain things, which required me to unlearn and be open to new processes.

Monitor: What got you into corporate governance, and why do you think it’s important?

Ankita Sangwan: I took a class on securities law at Columbia, which led me to the field of corporate governance. Class actions are unique to the United States and aren’t something we have back in India or that I’ve encountered in my studies of different jurisdictions. What’s interesting about it is that it’s a way for stockholders and individual investors to enforce their rights and seek reforms that wouldn’t otherwise be on the table. It’s also a way to keep corporate fiduciaries in check. Through that class, I came across a #MeToo case that Pomerantz was part of. I reached out to Gustavo Bruckner, the head of the Corporate Governance Team, because of that case. The remedies that the action pursued were interesting, not just in monetary compensation but also in terms of governance and policy reforms at organizations. Corporate governance is important because it’s really about what’s right and wrong, and it inserts checks and balances to prevent future misconduct.

Monitor: What has been the most rewarding case you’ve worked on?

Ankita Sangwan: The Lordstown Motors case was highly rewarding. It was a novel case against a SPAC – a public, “empty shell” Special Purpose Acquisition Company created with the sole intention of acquiring another company to take it public. Unlike the traditional method of going public via an initial public offering, SPACs bypass traditional initial public offerings and can be driven by conflicting incentives. In this case, we filed a class action where we alleged that the SPAC fiduciaries were conflicted by their own interests to get a deal done and close the transaction and, in the process, hid red flags about the company. It was later revealed that fiduciaries failed to disclose material facts on the vehicle’s production deadlines, pre-orders, etc. We conducted extensive discovery and researched a unique area of law, which was a valuable learning experience. When I joined Pomerantz, we were at the beginning of the discovery phase. It was fascinating to discuss this case with all counsel, understand the key focus points and observe negotiations between parties. The case lasted approximately 7 to 8 months from the start of my involvement until it settled favorably for stockholders in June 2024, a notable achievement given that the company had filed for bankruptcy.

Monitor: What advice do you have for younger lawyers looking to get into corporate governance?

Ankita Sangwan: Keep an open mind because cases may not pan out the way you think they should. Justice has various forms. When you start out, you are passionate about a particular point or case, but managing expectations is important. Ligation is a marathon, it’s not a race. You’re in it for the long haul. Sometimes, you’ll get great wins out of the gate, and sometimes, you won’t. It’s important to have patience and learn from all the victories and losses along the way.

Monitor: Have there been any influential mentors or anyone who has shaped your career as a lawyer?

Ankita Sangwan: Everyone I have met throughout my career is someone I have learned from. I worked under an amazing female partner in India, from whom I learned a great deal. I’ve also had many inspiring professors at law school. For instance, I took a class on the intersection between constitutional law and socioeconomic rights, and I was inspired to view constitutional law differently. I also took a seminar on securities law and got valuable insights from my professors, who were defense attorneys, about how they managed and strategized for cases. In my current role, the learning never stops. I’ve learned from both Gustavo and Sam [Adams] about when to push and pull back in negotiations, how to strategize cases, and just how to be a reasonable and good lawyer. I am very fortunate to have met the people I have, and I’ve learned from all of them.

The Most Magical Proxy Battle

By Stephanie Weaver

The biggest story of the 2024 proxy season was the thwarted attempt of activist investor Nelson Peltz and Trian Fund Management LLP (“Trian”), an alternative investment management fund that he co-found­ed, to secure two board seats on the Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) board of directors.

The $600-million battle between Peltz and Disney management was the most expensive proxy fight in corporate history. Analyzing the strate­gies employed by each party provides insights for future proxy battles at major public companies. While not all possess Disney’s financial re­sources or media prowess, they can adapt lessons from this conflict to tailor their fighting style to their specific strengths and the needs of their retail investors. Although Peltz did not succeed in obtaining the board seats, ultimately this battle gave Disney a push to institute changes that could enhance its stock performance.

On March 4, 2024, Trian published a 133-page white paper manifesto entitled Restore the Magic at The Walt Disney Company, calling for significant reform at Disney. A group put together by Trian held roughly $3.5 billion in Disney stock at the time. Trian aimed to have Peltz and Jay Rasulo, a former CFO at Disney, appointed to the company’s board. Its manifesto demanded an overhaul of the board and a reimagining of Disney’s business strategy. One of Peltz’s main criticisms was that the company did not have a succession plan for CEO Bob Iger’s eventual replacement. This was evidenced by the revolving-door tenure of Bob Chapek, who was appointed as Iger’s successor in 2020 and ousted in 2022, after which Iger returned to his old job.

 Trian had launched a previous campaign advocating for numerous changes at Disney in 2023. While Trian eventually withdrew from that proxy contest, it spurred Disney to launch a series of initiatives that aligned with Train’s suggestions and caused its stock to rise significantly. By proactively and preemptively responding to potential criticisms from Trian’s 2024 campaign, Disney positioned itself to effectively counter some of the expected negative feedback. While other companies may not have the advantage of foreseeing a detailed preview into a future campaign, maintaining regular meetings with shareholders, especially activist ones, being open to feedback and responsive to calls for change can significantly bolster a company’s defense against future proxy fights.

 As the battle unfolded, both sides launched campaigns to garner support from institutional and retail investors. In a typical proxy fight, institutional investors are crucial, as they hold the majority of the shares. Individual retail investors often side with management if they vote at all. However, Disney’s sub­stantial retail shareholder base, which accounts for up to 40% of its shares, primarily consists of investors who are passionate about the brand. This loyalty translates into strong opinions about the company’s management, making it important to meaningfully engage with these investors.

Peltz reached out to large institutional investors with targeted influence campaigns while using mass media to engage Disney’s enormous retail investor base. His strat­egy included promoting Trian’s RestoreTheMagic.com website and coordinating online interviews with Peltz and Rasulo alongside lengthy profiles of Peltz in the New York Times and the Financial Times. Peltz attempted to attract retail investors unhappy with the company’s recent con­tent and political stances. He received endorsements from influential entities such as Institutional Sharehold­er Services (“ISS”), a shareholder advisory firm, current and former directors of firms including Mondelez Interna­tional Inc., Procter & Gamble Co. and Janus Henderson Group Plc, proxy advisor Egan-Jones and Disney investor Neuberger Berman. Although not a shareholder, Elon Musk expressed support, indicating that he would invest in the company if Peltz joined Disney’s board.

Disney shelled out tens of millions of dollars to advertise on financial news websites and popular Hollywood pod­casts and secured endorsements from high-profile, influ­ential investors, including the legendary Hollywood film­maker and largest individual shareholder in the company, George Lucas, the shareholder advisory firm Glass Lewis & Co., activist investor ValueAct Capital Management, JPMorgan Chase & Co. CEO Jamie Dimon, Laurene Powell Jobs and members of the Disney family. Disney also garnered support from its biggest share­holders, institutional investors Vanguard Group, Inc. and BlackRock, Inc.

Disney launched a website providing updates on the implementation of its strategic plan, which was initiated after Trian’s first proxy contest in 2023. This website featured a video starring iconic Disney characters en­couraging shareholders to use Disney’s white proxy card and only vote for Disney’s nominees. With Mickey Mouse and other icons at its disposal, Disney played to its strengths with lifelong fans of its media and theme parks. Ultimately, 75% of Disney’s retail shareholders supported the company’s slate.

As retail investment continues to grow, companies and activist investors alike can benefit from forming strate­gies for creative engagement with retail investors. Disney effectively engaged with its shareholders by leveraging its expertise and lovable characters. It will be interesting to see what areas of expertise other large public companies might be able to bring to the table in future proxy battles.

 Previously, shareholders would choose between two slates of board candidates proposed by companies or activist investors. A new SEC “universal proxy rule” that allows shareholders to more easily vote for a mix of nominees from both sides may have played a role in the Disney outcome. According to the April 4, 2024 Dealbook News- letter from the New York Times, “because each side was fighting against specific individuals, instead of against an entire slate, attacks became more personal. … The new system also enabled another activist investor in Disney’s stock, Blackwell Capital, to campaign against Peltz, dividing the opposition.”

 Disney’s proxy contest was conducted under a plurality voting standard, meaning the nominees with the greatest number of votes would win the available board seats. Trian recommended that shareholders vote for its two nominees and withhold on two Disney nominees, Michael Froman and Maria Elena Lagomasino, while labeling the remaining Disney nominees as acceptable. Despite Lagomasino and Froman receiving the lowest support among the Disney nominees,ultimately Trian’s strategy did not garner enough support to secure enough votes for Peltz and Rasulo. A better strategy may have been to have shareholders vote for both Trian’s nominees while not voting for any company nominees.

 While Peltz seemed to be gaining momentum in the lead- up to the vote, his efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. On April 3, 2024, he lost, garnering only 31% of votes cast. Meanwhile, Iger received 94% support, and every one of Disney’s 12 nominees was elected.

 In the end, it’s not all bad news for activist investors like Pelz, particularly if their ultimate goal is to spur change in the company and drive up the stock. While he lost the proxy battle, Disney did implement a number of meaningful changes, and its stock rose 30% post vote. In a post-vote statement, Trian said it is “proud of the impact we have had in refocusing this company on value creation and good governance.” Perhaps the magic was (at least in part) restored after all.

Nikola Investors Win Class Certification in Securities Fraud Litigation

By Michael J. Wernke

On January 6, 2025, Judge Steven P. Logan of the District of Arizona granted Pomerantz’s motion for certi­fication of a class in its securities fraud litigation against Nikola Corporation and certain of its officers and direc­tors. The action is brought on behalf of investors who purchased stock in Nikola, an electric vehicle manu­facturer that went public on June 4, 2020 via a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) transaction. The complaint alleges that Nikola, its founder and chairman, Trevor Milton, and other officers and directors violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as well as section 20(a), the “control person” provision, by issuing false statements concerning essentially every aspect of the company’s business.

During the relevant period, Nikola claimed that it pro­duced zero emissions vehicles, including hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs), as well as hydrogen fuel for FCEVs. While Pomerantz’s complaint alleges that Defendants’ fraud spanned numerous topics touching on every aspect of Nikola’s business, in essence the fraud can be broken down into three main categories of misrepresentations.

First, Nikola claimed it had developed a fully operational “zero-emissions” Nikola One tractor trailer truck as well as a FCEV/BEV pick-up truck, the Badger. In truth, the Nikola One was an empty shell that was incapable of moving under its own power and the company had long-ago abandoned production of the vehicle. Moreover, the Badger was nothing more than a preliminary digital ren­dering of a vehicle. Second, Nikola claimed it had over 14,000 binding purchase orders for its trucks, represent­ing “billions and billions” in revenue. In truth, essentially all the orders were non-binding and were for the inop­erable, and since abandoned, Nikola One. Third, Milton repeatedly asserted that Nikola was producing hydrogen at less than a quarter of the cost industry experts be­lieved was possible. In truth, Nikola had never produced any hydrogen at all, let alone at the low prices claimed.

 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were motivated by greed. Milton – the architect of the fraud – aimed to inflate the expectations and stock price of Nikola and to benefit from the resulting excitement to secure partnerships with top auto companies, which would further inflate Nikola’s share price. As Nikola’s single largest shareholder, Milton openly admitted within the company that he planned to dump his shares as soon as he was contractually permitted to do so, which was only six months after Nikola went public and before the market could dis­cover that the company, like the Nikola One, was an empty vessel. The other Defendants encouraged Milton to uti­lize social media to directly engage with retail investors. Despite know­ing of his fraudulent scheme, they championed his self-described “media blitzes” of misinformation because they, too, were large shareholders who stood to gain millions, if not billions, from Milton’s fraud.

Investors began to learn the truth when Nikola’s stock price plummeted following a September 10, 2020 Hindenburg Research report. Having gathered “extensive evidence—including recorded phone calls, text messages, private emails and behind-the-scenes photographs,” Hindenburg identified “dozens of false statements by [Milton],” which had led Hindenburg to conclude that Nikola “is an intricate fraud built on dozens of lies over the course of . . . Milton’s career.” There-after, the DOJ and SEC began investigations, Nikola’s partners pulled out and Milton was forced to resign. He was later indicted for, and convicted of, fraud. Nikola’s stock price plummeted 76% over the course of time that these facts were disclosed.

One requirement for class certification is that issues common to the class predominate over individualized issues. Many fraudulent misrepresentation claims do not obtain class certification because the issue of whether a class member actually relied on the alleged misrepresen­tation is an individualized inquiry. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that when federal secu­rities fraud plaintiffs establish that the securities at issue traded in an efficient market they are entitled to a “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance. In other words, it is presumed that investors relied on the Defendants’ misrepresentations when purchasing the security at the market price. The presumption is founded on the theory that in an efficient market the price of a stock incorporates all available public information. Therefore, any person who purchases shares relies on the integrity of the market price and, consequently, any misrepre­sentations made by the company. This presumption, if obtained, largely eliminates an individualized inquiry of reliance that would prevent class certification.

Here, Pomerantz explained to the Court that all of the market efficiency factors traditionally analyzed by courts supported a finding that Nikola securities traded in an efficient market. For example, Nikola securities traded on the NASDAQ, a large national exchange. Moreover, factors such as the weekly trading volume, analyst coverage and the stock price’s quick response to news all indicated that the market was efficient.

Nevertheless, Defendants argued that because Nikola was a pre-revenue company that had gone public through a SPAC, the market was not efficient in the early weeks of public trading. For example, Defendants as­serted that pursuant to the company going public, large portions of Nikola stock could not be traded because of “lock-up” agreements that prohibited insiders from trad­ing their shares, which Defendants claimed placed sig­nificant constraints on short-trading and that therefore, Nikola’s stock price did not fully reflect downside pessi­mistic views. Defendants also argued that the high vola­tility of Nikola’s stock price and the lack of significance of financial results for a pre-revenue company rendered the traditional indicators of market efficiency that Plaintiffs proffered unreliable.

The Court rejected Defendants’ arguments. Notably, the Court found that Plaintiffs sufficiently addressed Defen­dants’ argument about lock-up constraints on shares. Specifically, even when taking into consideration that cer­tain shares could not be traded, the short interest trading in Nikola securities compared favorably to other securi­ties that trade in efficient markets. Moreover, the short interest in Nikola securities increased as more negative news about the company was released, which would be expected in an efficient market. Finally, not a single ana­lyst covering Nikola expressed any concern about a short sale constraint during the period. The Court thus found that Nikola securities traded in an efficient market.

The Court’s inquiry did not end there. The “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance is just that – a presump­tion. It can be rebutted if the defendants demonstrate that, despite the market being efficient, the misrepresen­tations at issue were not reflected in the market price. Here, Defendants argued that the fraud-related infor­mation contained in the Hindenburg Report was already publicly known to the market prior to the publication of the Report. Because an efficient market quickly incorporates all publicly available information into the market price of the security, Defendants argued that the stock price decline following the Report must have been a result of non-fraud related information in the Report.

The Court rejected this argument as well, finding that Pomerantz had demonstrated that much of the fraud-related information contained in the Hindenburg Report had not been revealed before, and to the extent some of it had been made public, Defendants had denied any wrongdoing and assured investors that their prior state­ments were true, preventing the disclosure of the infor­mation from being fully reflected in Nikola’s stock price.

The Nikola opinion is particularly significant because it provides a roadmap for class certification where the defendant company had gone public through a SPAC, which has become a much more prevalent scenario. Although a company that goes public via a SPAC has unique features that may differ from those that go public via traditional IPOs, this decision holds that they are distinctions without a difference when analyzing market efficiency for the purposes of class certification, an important precedent for future investors.

Q&A with Of Counsels Brian O’Connell and Christopher Tourek

By Katarina Marcial

The Editors had the opportunity to chat with Brian O’ Connell and Christopher Tourek, both based in the Firm’s Chicago office, to learn about their career journeys, the motivations behind their pursuit of securities litigation, their most rewarding cases and what advice they have for aspiring lawyers. Last year, both Brian and Christopher achieved the significant milestone of being promoted from Associate to Of Counsel.

Monitor: Can you share a little about your background and interests?

Brian O’Connell: I grew up in the Chicago suburbs, attended Stanford for my undergrad, went to Northwestern for law school and I’ve remained in Chicago ever since. My wife and I have an infant daughter, which is my main “interest” right now. I’m a long-suffering Chicago sports fan of the White Sox, Bulls and Bears. My hobbies include golf and participating in a shuffleboard league. I’m licensed in both Illinois and California, which has proved beneficial, as Pomerantz’s cases span the country. Last year, I went to eight different states in four different time zones for either court appearances or depositions.

Christopher Tourek: I was born and raised in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. I attended Lafayette College in Easton, PA for undergrad and the University of Illinois College of Law for law school. The Windy City has been my home since 2013. Class action law has been my path from the start, a field that I love deeply. With twelve other attorneys in my family, you could say it runs in the blood. Our reunions are loud, heated, and never dull. I now live in Lincoln Park with my fiancée. Life here is good. I dive into books, explore the world through travel, hit the pavement running, carve down ski slopes, and train in Brazilian jiu-jitsu. Each pursuit, in its own way, keeps me grounded and focused.

 Monitor: What got you interested in securities litigation?

 Brian O’Connell: My interest in securities law comes from my interest in financial markets. My first real exposure to the financial markets was during an internship with the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) during undergrad. That internship and the 2008 financial crash and Dodd-Frank regula­tions led me to financial services litigation, which I’ve been doing essentially my entire career, either on the securities or commodities litigation sides, which is what I worked in before I came to Pomerantz.

 Christopher Tourek: In law school, I took a class called Perspectives on Debt. It wasn’t just theory—it was history and consequence. We traced the arc of financial markets, from the Dutch Tulip Bubble in 1637 to the railroad manias of the 19th century, and on to the crash of 2008. What stayed with me wasn’t just the mechanics of securities fraud, but its cost—real and devastating. This class changed how I saw the law.

Monitor: Why is this work so important to you?

 Brian O’Connell: I wanted to represent the victims rather than protect well-capitalized wrongdoers, and that’s exactly what I get to do at Pomerantz. Securities litigation is unique, requiring creative approaches since every case is different and lacks formal discovery before filing. Sometimes, we need to act like TV detectives speaking with former employees to crack a case and other times, we can use math and logic to catch powerful CEOs in fraud. The variety makes the work exciting.

 Christopher Tourek: Fraud doesn’t just gut the market; it ripples outward. It fuels bubbles and crashes, triggers recessions, shrinks economies. Businesses cut back, jobs vanish, homes are lost. The harm isn’t confined to traders or investors. It hits everyone, even those far from the market. Graduates stepping into a recession face years of harder roads, lower earnings, and deeper struggles. Protecting against the sweeping, lasting dam­age of unchecked securities fraud felt urgent—necessary. So, when the chance came to join Pomerantz LLP and take up that fight, I didn’t hesitate. This work matters. It always will.

Monitor: What have been the most rewarding cases you have worked on at Pomerantz?

Brian O’Connell: My favorite Pomerantz work has been on SPAC cases. We recently had a de-SPAC case against Grab Holdings, Inc., which is known as the Uber of Southeast Asia. I gave the oral argument that successfully sustained claims under Section 11 of the Securities Act and Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act claims. In another de-SPAC case against Ginkgo Bioworks, we successfully advanced novel legal issues relating to SPACs. Outside of SPAC cases, we’ve recently had some cases go deep into discovery, which helps our approach for future cases. In total, my cases reached settlement agreements exceeding $100 million in 2024.

Christopher Tourek: The most rewarding case I’ve worked on, In Re Bed Bath & Beyond Corporation Securities Litigation, is still unfolding. In this case, we built something bold—a legal theory rooted in a pump-and-dump scheme orchestrated through emojis on social media. We pursued novel claims under Section 9 of the Exchange Act. It took grit and clarity to unravel the fraud and present it to the Court. Drafting the Amended Complaint, countering the Motion to Dismiss—each step was a battle. But we stood firm, and the Court ultimately sided with us. That victory wasn’t just about the law; it was about the challenge, the complexity, and the collective drive of our team to push forward into discovery. Another case that holds a place in my memory is Gong v. Neptune Wellness. It was my first at Pomerantz, and though the $4.25 million settlement in cash and stock wasn’t revolutionary, it was meaningful. I worked closely with the Lead Plaintiff, and when it was over, his gratitude—the sense of justice restored, even in part—reminded me why I do this work. The law can be a long road, but moments like that make the miles worth it.

 Monitor: What is your best advice to younger attorneys looking to succeed in securities litigation?

Brian O’Connell: Being the smartest person in the room isn’t as important as being the best prepared. Take the time to research the judge overseeing the case as their past experiences and rulings can guide your arguments.

Christopher Tourek: Never stop learning. My work on fraud cases spans various industries, including marijuana, home robotics, and banking, each one demanding something new—a deep dive into an industry until I could not only see the fraud but lay it out clearly for a court. Success depends on it. To do this work, you need more than skill; you need an unrelenting drive to learn, to dig deeper, and to keep going until the picture is clear. That urge to learn never ends—and it shouldn’t.

Pomerantz: A Dedication to Education

By Katarina Marcial

Pomerantz takes pride in being a thought leader in the ever-evolving fields of securities litigation and corporate governance. The firm’s philosophy is that education is a keystone of community, problem-solving and innovation. Through its educational initiatives, Pomerantz actively engages with institutional investors and corporate governance experts, bringing them together through various platforms, including panels, conferences and the firm’s signature Corporate Roundtable events. Pomerantz personnel also regularly participate in events organized by others, frequently as featured speakers. The final quarter of 2024 was no exception, as Jeremy A. Lieberman, Jennifer Pafiti and Dr. Daniel Summerfield participated in educational events worldwide.

Jeremy, Pomerantz’s Managing Partner, has been crisscrossing the globe for decades to meet institutional investors where they are based, educate them on their rights within and beyond the U.S. and listen to their needs. A font of legal knowledge and gifted speaker, Jeremy is frequently invited to share his insights at investor events. On November 13, 2024, he participated in a dynamic fireside chat with Leonor Martins Machado, Managing Associate at Morais Leitão, at the Global Class Actions Symposium hosted by Global Legal Group in Lisbon, Portugal. During their one-on-one conversation, Jeremy offered his perspective on the U.S. class action system, addressing topics such as securities fraud cases, the impact of the Morrison ruling – which barred recovery for losses in foreign-traded securities under the U.S. federal securities laws – and the appeal of class actions in the U.S. for investors worldwide.

Jennifer Pafiti, Partner and Head of Client Services, is dually qualified to practice law in the U.S. and the U.K. She spearheads the firm’s educational initiatives, including its Corporate Governance Roundtables, which gather some of the most influential institutional investors and corporate governance experts worldwide to discuss real-time matters that affect the value of the funds they represent.

In June 2024, Jennifer organized a Roundtable in London with special guest Sir Tony Blair, who provided an insightful assessment of the state of global affairs. Another guest speaker was Dame Laura Kenny, the U.K.’s most decorated Olympian.

Jennifer is based in Pomerantz’s Los Angeles office and co-manages its London office with Dr. Daniel Summerfield, Director of ESG and UK Client Services. Daniel joined Pomerantz in October 2022 after 20 years at the Universities Superannuation Scheme (“USS”), the United Kingdom’s largest private pension fund. Most recently, Daniel was Head of Corporate Affairs of USS, following a period of 16 years as head of Responsible Investment.

Pomerantz was a sponsor of the 2024 International Corporate Governance Network Conference held on November 12-14, 2024 in Melbourne, Australia, where Jennifer and Daniel participated in a panel on governance challenges facing investors. Their dialogue offered valuable strategies for long-term investor engagement with policymakers. They had the honor of speaking alongside Kate Griffiths from ACSI, Massimo Menchini from Assogestioni, and Luz Rodriguez from the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association. This panel of experts weighed in on the appropriate timing, issues to address and channels and tools that institutional investors may utilize for effective engagement, giving conference attendees actionable takeaways to implement. Additionally, Pomerantz hosted a dinner at The Society Restaurant in Melbourne, where Jennifer engaged in a spirited debate with Amy D’Eugenio, Sustainability Director at Federated Hermes Ltd., on the role of securities litigation for institutional investors.

The end of the year proved to be busy for Daniel. On November 20, 2024, he participated in a panel discussion at Assogestioni’s Board-Shareholder Dialogue Conference in Rome, where he explored the evolution of board-shareholder dialogues and examined case studies highlighting the successes and challenges of facilitating effective engagements.

Back in London, on December 5, Daniel co-hosted a breakfast event for UK pension fund trustees with QuietRoom, a pension fund communication consultancy business. During the event, insights from both pension lawyers’ and trustees’ perspectives were shared, including best practices and common pitfalls to avoid in order to ensure meaningful reporting and beneficial outcomes for pension fund beneficiaries.

Later that day, Daniel gave an in-house training session to a group of professional trustees in London. He discussed the increase in ESG and climate litigation cases in many markets, including the UK, and outlined some of the reasons behind this development, pointing to some important case studies. Daniel also looked towards the future, highlighting some issues of which trustees should be aware, including greenwashing and the importance of both evidence-based reporting and having a securities litigation monitoring program in place.

Pomerantz kicked off December by hosting a private lunch for institutional investors in London, featuring Lord Peter Mandelson as Guest of Honor. During the gathering, Lord Mandelson, a key architect of the UK Labour Party's transformation and a trusted advisor to Prime Minister Keir Starmer, discussed the new UK government agenda, the challenges facing British politics and the UK's changing role on the global stage. Jeremy, Jennifer and Daniel presided over the event.

Pomerantz reaffirmed its dedication to education in Q4 2024 and is already scheduling events for 2025. For information on where you can engage with the Pomerantz team, be sure to check out “Notable dates on the Pomerantz horizon” in each issue of the Monitor.  

Katarina Marcial is Pomerantz’s Senior Marketing Manager.

$12 Million Settlement for PureCycle Investors

By the Editors

While efforts to protect and preserve the environment are certainly commendable, issuing false and misleading statements to unwary investors regarding the viability and efficacy of such efforts are not. Pomerantz LLP, as sole Lead Counsel, recently achieved a $12 million settlement in a securities class action against PureCycle Technologies, Inc. arising from false and misleading statements PureCycle and its top executives issued regarding their plastics recycling technology. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted final approval of the settlement on October 8, 2024. Partner Tamar A. Weinrib led the litigation, Theodore v. PureCycle Technologies, Inc., et al., No. 6:21-cv-809 (M.D. Fla.). 

PureCycle went public via a de-SPAC reverse merger with Roth CH Acquisition I Co., a SPAC formed by Byron Roth. PureCycle had the dubious honor of being merely one in a long line of questionable reverse mergers Byron Roth has brought public while misleading investors regarding the underlying business, only to slap a “buy” rating on the stock and collect millions in compensation, leaving unknowing investors to suffer the consequences. Prior to taking on SPAC mergers, defendant Roth was well known for his role in facilitating numerous suspect reverse mergers involving Chinese companies, raising approximately $3.1 billion for China-based clients from 2003 to 2012. Indeed, defendant Roth was prominently featured in the 2017 documentary “The China Hustle,” detailing the nearly decades-long Chinese reverse merger scandal, which Vanity Fair called “the biggest financial scandal you’ve never heard of.”

Since its inception, PureCycle has never earned any meaningful revenue, has incurred recurring losses and has sustained negative cash flows. Its only product is a process for recycling polypropylene (“PP”), a common plastic used in multiple applications including packaging, manufacturing and consumer goods. Despite their best efforts, the world’s scientists and chemical companies have found it impossible to effectively or economically recycle PP since its invention in 1951.

However, as the complaint Pomerantz filed on behalf of aggrieved investors alleged, defendants issued false and misleading statements throughout the class period claiming to have achieved the impossible.  Specifically, the complaint alleged that defendants represented in proxy statements, a registration statement and in press releases that their recycling process was “proven” to convert waste polypropylene (called feedstock) into virgin polypropylene resin more cost effectively than manufacturing virgin polypropylene traditionally and utilizing a broader range of feedstock than traditional recycling. In reality (as multiple industry experts attested), the technology underlying the process was unproven and presented serious issues even at lab scale, the economics of conducting the process at commercial scale are cost prohibitive and the process could not cost effectively utilize a broader range of feedstock than traditional recycling. Defendants further touted the PureCycle management team that claimed to have solved the previously unsolvable polypropylene recycling problem as having “broad experience across plastics,” decades of experience scaling early-stage companies in public markets and having led transformational projects, though they in fact had no background in plastics recycling and previously brought six other early-stage companies public that subsequently imploded, causing substantial investor losses.

In May 2021, Hindenburg Research published a report entitled “PureCycle: The Latest Zero-Revenue ESG SPAC Charade, sponsored by the Worst of Wall Street,” which challenged defendants’ claims regarding the efficacy and safety of PureCycle’s recycling technology and the PureCycle management team’s professional experience. The report quoted PureCycle as claiming, “Up to this point it’s been impossible to recycle plastic into pure, virgin-like form. But here’s the thing. At PureCycle Technologies, the word impossible is not in our vocabulary.”

The Hindenburg Research report emphasized the persistent obstacles that historically stymied efforts to effectively and economically recycle polypropylene, setting the backdrop against which PureCycle claimed to have achieved a previously unattainable feat:

While [Purecycle’s claim] makes for a great sounding “green” story, plastics recycling has been a perpetual challenge from an economic standpoint. The industry has struggled with the economics of even the most basic plastic recycling for decades, as documented in a 2020 NPR exposé titled “How Big Oil Misled The Public Into Believing Plastic Would Be Recycled”.

Within plastics recycling, PP has been particularly uneconomical. PP represents 28% of the world’s plastic, yet currently only ~0.8% of it is recycled today. This is because a sizable amount of PP requires expensive sorting and cleaning due to its use in food packaging. It is also commonly found in products that use mixed plastics that can be difficult to separate. 

The allegations of the Hindenburg Research report caused PureCycle’s stock price to plummet about 40% in a single day, damaging investors. Though PureCycle issued a press release in response to the Hindenburg Research report, defendants did not actually challenge, much less negate, any of the underlying allegations. Just a few months later, defendants revealed that the SEC had issued an investigative subpoena to defendant Otworth “requesting testimony in connection with a non-public, fact-finding investigation of the Company” pertaining to “among other things, statements made in connection with PCT’s technology, financial projections, key supply agreements, and management.”

After nearly three years of hard-fought litigation during which the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, with discovery well underway and plaintiffs’ class certification motion pending, the parties agreed to settle the action for $12 million.

“Though we maintain confidence in the strength and merits of the claim, the settlement is an excellent result for the settlement class,” states Tamar. “The all-cash settlement provides certain recovery now, whereas there are sizable risks of recovering any judgment at trial given the complexities of this type of litigation, the company’s tenuous financial condition and the fact that PureCycle has yet to earn any meaningful revenue from its sole product.”

$7.5 Million Settlement for Faraday Investors

By the Editors

On March 18, 2024, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted final approval of a $7.5 million settlement in a shareholder action against Los Angeles-based luxury electric vehicle company Faraday Future Intelligent Electric, Inc. (“Faraday”). The suit alleged that Faraday misled investors regarding its reservations and financial outlook prior to going public via a de-SPAC merger. Partner Austin P. Van led the litigation, Zhou v. Faraday Future Intelligent Electric Inc., et al., No. 2:21- cv-09914 (C.D. Cal.).

Faraday was formed in 2021 through the de-SPAC merger of the SPAC, Property Solutions Acquisition Corp. (“PSAC”), with FF Intelligent Mobility Global Holdings Ltd., (“Legacy FF”), a private startup electric vehicle company. Legacy FF was founded in 2014 by defendant Yueting Jia, known as “China’s best-known securities fraudster.” On July 21, 2021, with the merger completed, Faraday began publicly trading on the NASDAQ.

Legacy FF first showcased its FF91 – the company’s first production car, at a “very big event in Las Vegas,” in 2017, according to Matthew Lynley of Techcrunch.com, who live-blogged from the event. According to Lynley, “Faraday Future has thus far been very flashy, but has yet to get a product in the hands of consumers — and it needs to get there. But at least part of the way is finally showing a production car, which Faraday Future tried to do with bravado at the event.”

The lawsuit against Faraday stems from the company's assertions regarding its innovative technologies, production capabilities, and market potential, which generated significant investor interest and financial backing. Over time, it became clear that Faraday’s promises were not being met. The company experienced numerous production delays, missed financial targets, and repeatedly postponed the launch of its much-anticipated vehicles. It was later revealed that Faraday had allegedly overstated its production capabilities and the operational readiness of its facilities. Reports revealed that the flagship factory was far from being operational, allegedly contradicting the positive outlook presented by company executives.

Plaintiffs alleged that Faraday wildly misrepresented the level of committed reservations it had for its flagship car by repeatedly telling investors that “its first flagship model, the FF 91, ha[d] received over 14,000 reservations.” In fact, Faraday had obtained only several hundred paid reservations for the FF 91 at the time of these misstatements.

This gross exaggeration was highly material to investors. Under reasonable assumptions using the company’s claimed selling price for the FF 91 of approximately $200,000, Faraday repeatedly claimed in effect that it would achieve revenue of $2.52 billion soon after producing its first vehicle, which overstates by orders of magnitude the approximately $54 million in revenue the company would have achieved from the few hundred paid reservations it actually held. In February 2022, following an internal investigation using outside auditors, Faraday admitted in a report on Form 8-K that:

The Company’s statements leading up to the Business Combination that it had received more than 14,000 reservations for the FF 91 vehicle were potentially misleading because only several hundred of those reservations were paid, while the others (totaling 14,000) were unpaid indications of interest.

That is, Faraday effectively admitted to the core of the securities law violations under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act pleaded in the complaint.

As stated in plaintiffs’ amended complaint, Faraday also repeatedly misled investors about its ability to bring the FF 91 to market within twelve months of the business combination, i.e., the de-SPAC merger. For example, in soliciting votes in support of the business combination, defendants boasted, “FF . . . is positioned to launch a production try-out in 9 months and commercial production of FF 91 series within 12 months after the Business Combination.”

While the federal securities laws permit a company to be optimistic about its future, they do not permit a company to mislead investors about goals known to be impossible to achieve. During Pomerantz’s litigation, multiple confidential witnesses confirmed that at no point during the class period was Faraday even close to being in a position in its design and manufacturing of the FF 91 to claim that it could bring that model to market within one year of the SPAC merger. That achievement was impossible, and Faraday knew as much. Accordingly, Faraday’s statements that it could bring the FF 91 to market within one year of the de-SPAC merger violated Section 10(b) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act, and Section 11 of the Securities Act.

The truth began to emerge on October 7, 2021, when J Capital Research published a report explaining that Faraday’s claimed 14,000 deposits were likely fabricated, because 78% of those reservations were made by a single undisclosed company that was likely an affiliate. The report further explained that contrary to representations of progress toward manufacturing made by Faraday, former engineering executives did not believe that the car was close to being ready for production.

On November 15, 2021, Faraday disclosed that its board of directors “formed a special committee of independent directors to review allegations of inaccurate disclosures,” including the claims in the J Capital Report. Among other things, the special committee identified “certain inconsistencies in statements to investors and certain weaknesses in its corporate controls and culture, as detailed in the Form 8-K.”

On April 14, 2022, Faraday announced that “additional investigative and remedial work in connection with the independent investigation has now been completed and on April 12, 2022, the Board approved certain additional remedial actions, effective immediately.” In particular, Faraday announced that Jia would be removed as an executive officer, along with other disciplinary actions and terminations of employment with respect to other Faraday employees.

In moving for approval of the settlement, lead plaintiffs told the court, "The settlement provides a substantial recovery to the settlement class despite several obstacles that plaintiffs faced, including the amount of potentially recoverable damages, defendants' potential defenses, defendants' ability to pay a larger amount and the risks of prosecuting this litigation through trial and appeals."

Pomerantz Finalizes Settlement on Behalf of Ginkgo Bioworks Investors

By the Editors

On December 13, 2024, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted final approval to a $17.75 million settlement on behalf of investors in a securities class action against Ginkgo Bioworks Holdings, Inc. and several officers of Ginkgo and the predecessor SPAC. It was alleged that Ginkgo and its leadership distorted the company’s finances to gain shareholder approval of a SPAC merger that would take the company public. Joshua B. Silverman and Brian P. O’Connell led the litigation.  Bernstein v. Ginkgo Bioworks Holdings Inc et al., No. 4:21-cv-08943 (N.D. Cal.).

In its SPAC merger filings, which valued Ginkgo at $15 billion, the company stated that it makes money "in much the same way that cloud computing companies charge usage fees for utilization of computing capacity or contract research organizations charge for services."

However, as Lead Plaintiff alleged in her complaint, Ginkgo’s largest outside investors, whose collective stake in the company totaled nearly 43%, provided the overwhelming majority of funds that were then recirculated back to Ginkgo in “round-trip transactions,” in some cases as purported prepayments for Ginkgo's services.

Shareholders overwhelmingly approved the merger between Ginkgo and the SPAC Soaring Eagle. On September 17, 2021, following the merger, shares of Ginkgo’s common stock began trading on the NYSE under the ticker symbol “DNA.”

On October 6, 2021, market research Scorpion Capital released a short-seller report in which it alleged that Ginkgo is a “colossal scam,” describing the company as a “shell game” whose revenue was highly dependent on related party transactions. According to the report, Scorpion Capital based its findings on an “intensive investigation into Ginkgo’s business model and practices, with a particular focus on the related-party entities that drive the bulk of its revenue.”  Another short-seller, Citron, came out with a brief report that same day that largely agreed with Scorpion Capital’s findings. Lead Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that on this news,  Ginkgo’s share price plunged approximately 12%, damaging investors.

A securities lawsuit was filed in November 2021, and Pomerantz was appointed lead counsel on behalf of the proposed class of investors. The case was initially brought as a Section 10(b) action but was expanded in the amended complaint to include Section 11 and Section 14(a) claims. 

A Section 10(b) claim applies to a material misstatement or omission made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security and requires proof of scienter (the intent to deceive). A Section 11 claim specifically targets false or misleading information within a registration statement for a public offering. A Section 14(a) claim focuses on misleading statements made in proxy materials related to shareholder votes.

In March 2023, the district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Lead Plaintiff’s Section 10(b) and 14(a) claims. Importantly, it found that Lead Plaintiff had alleged that the short-seller reports were corrective disclosures. The Court opined that since the Scorpion Capital report involved 21 research interviews encompassing a broad sample of former employees and executives of Ginkgo, as well as individuals who were then employed at its related-party customers, it “provided new information that was not previously reflected in the stock price.”

The Court found that Lead Plaintiff had alleged falsity, noting that “the fact that the company’s primary customers … operated out of Ginkgo’s headquarters, that many listed Ginkgo’s phone number as their own, and that Ginkgo used intertwined employees, managers, and directors to control these ‘customers’ would surely satisfy the falsity requirement given that Defendants disclosed that it lacked control over these entities.”

The Court also sustained Lead Plaintiff’s 14(a) claims, agreeing with Pomerantz’s position that only allegations of a false or misleading statement made with negligence, not scienter, were required.

For Section 11, the Court dismissed Lead Plaintiff’s claims but granted Lead Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to expressly include the detailed tracing arguments made in the motion to dismiss briefing. The Court noted that it “finds that the assertions made in the opposition would satisfy the registration requirement, so amendment is certainly not futile.” Pomerantz refiled an amended complaint to address the limited portion of the complaint that the Court had dismissed. The Section 11 claims proceeded to discovery along with the Sections 10(b) and 14(a) claims.

The $17.75 million settlement represents a favorable recovery for the class and involved novel legal issues related to SPACs. Additionally, the Pomerantz litigation team secured important rulings in the evolving area of the law concerning short-seller reports.

Pomerantz Saves an NYC Homeless Facility

By the Editors

Pomerantz Senior Counsel Marc I. Gross, a securities class action attorney with a decades-long record of fiercely litigat­ed successes on behalf of defrauded investors, embodies the generous spirit of community service in his pro bono work.

In his latest pro bono action, Marc intervened to provide a lifeline to Mainchance, a longtime midtown Manhattan homeless facility that had been threatened with closure by Mayor Eric Adams. To do so, he and his Pomerantz team filed an Article 78 proceeding – a civil lawsuit in New York State Supreme Court that challenges the legality of a New York State agency or official’s actions.

For over 35 years, Mainchance has operated a vital 24/7 Drop-In Center and food pantry in midtown. Drop-In Centers offer homeless individuals a place to sleep overnight on a first-come-first-served basis, along with meals, showers, medical services, and housing counseling. In the last year, over 45,000 visits were made to the facility. Drop-In Centers provide an alternative to shelters, which offer longer stays, to which many homeless individuals are resistant.

Despite receiving high ratings for its performance of essen­tial services, as well as maintaining partnerships with local institutions like NYU Langone and Baruch College, Main­chance was told in January 2024 that the NYC Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”), which funds its operation, was terminating Mainchance’s contract on June 30, 2024, two years before its expiration. No explanation was provided.

At the time, Marc was a volunteer at Mainchance’s Food Pantry and a member of its Board of Directors. Faced with the demise of what he knew to be a much-needed midtown institution and the loss of more than 30 jobs, Marc tapped Pomerantz associate Stephanie Weaver, paralegal Simon Hall, and legal assistant Taryn Sayre to help him fight the proverbial battle with City Hall.

At the outset, the task seemed especially daunting, given that Mainchance’s contract allowed the City to cancel at any time “without cause.” Undaunted, the Pomerantz team pressed DHS to provide reasons for the premature termi­nation. At a City Council hearing in April, the DHS Deputy Commissioner said that Mainchance was “underperforming.”

Pomerantz thereupon filed an administrative Notice of Dispute, challenging that characterization as contrary to DHS’ periodic audit reports. DHS formally responded by letter, acknowledging that Mainchance had not underper­formed, and indeed had benefited the neighborhood, but that the agency had decided to move away from the Drop-In Center model to a Safe Haven model. The major difference between the two models is that Safe Havens provide home­less individuals with beds rather than chairs to sleep in over­night. Mainchance responded by applauding the purported policy change and pointing out that it had already submitted a proposal to convert to a Safe Haven. It seemed suspect that, two days before advising Mainchance in writing that it was being terminated because the DHS was moving away from the Drop-In Center model, a DHS spokesperson had touted the Adams administrator’s investment in Drop-In Centers, including one scheduled to be opened this summer, while also acknowledging that Mainchance was the only Drop-In Center the agency had decided to terminate.

Faced with the looming June 30th deadline, Pomerantz filed a petition and a motion for an injunction on June 10, 2024. Fortunately, the Court promptly scheduled a hearing for June 23, after which it entered a temporary restraining order compelling continued funding until a full hearing could be held on July 23, 2024. Marc explained, “As strong as the facts appeared, we had to overcome the high hurdle of the contractual language, which clearly stated that the City could cancel the contract without cause.”

Pomerantz argued that despite this clause (which is standard and adhesive), any government agency decision is subject to court review if it is an “abuse of discretion,” arbitrary or clearly unreasonable (which are the standards for NYS Article 78 claims). This made sense given the exceptional power of governments relative to private contractors. In this case, the decision to terminate was particularly egregious given the homeless clients’ NYS Constitutional Right to Shelter. New York State case law is unsettled on this issue, with some courts holding that the contract language pre-empts any claims under Article 78, which allows proceed­ings to challenge decisions made by state and local govern­ments, while other courts hold that Article 78’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard pre-empts the contractual language.

Fortunately for Mainchance and its clients, Judge Lynn R. Kotler acknowledged that the closure of any shelter in the midst of a homeless crisis made little policy sense, and that the circumstances in this case clearly failed to meet the rea­sonableness standard. On September 19, 2024, the Court handed down a decision and order permanently barring ter­mination of the Mainchance contract prior to its expiration in June 2026.

In light of recent allegations that have surfaced against Mayor Adams, it is possible that the reason he chose to close this particular homeless facility is that is next door to a new, luxury high-rise hotel owned by Turkish business interests. The hotel was built by a Turkish construction company with offices in Brooklyn whose employees made donations to Mayor Adams’ political campaigns. Time will tell whether these entities and individuals are the same donors referenced in the recent indictment of the Mayor. In the meantime, Pomerantz is proud to have fought to save Mainchance, allowing it to continue providing important services to the New Yorkers who need them most.

Betting Against the House and Wynn-ing

 By Murielle Steven Walsh

After six years of fiercely contested litigation, Pomerantz achieved a $70 million settlement with defendants in a securities class action against Wynn Resorts Ltd. and several of its officers. This is one of the largest – if not the largest – settlements to date of Section 10b-5 claims arising solely from #MeToo allegations.

Wynn Resorts owns and operates luxury hotels and des­tination casino resorts, including Wynn Las Vegas and Encore in Las Vegas, Nevada; Wynn Boston Harbor in Everett, Massachusetts; and Wynn Macau and Wynn Palace in Macau, China.

Briefly, the case arises from a decades-long pattern of sexual abuse and harassment by the company’s billion­aire founder and former Chief Executive Officer, Stephen (Steve) Wynn that was unchecked, tacitly permitted, and eventually covered up by defendants. In March 2016, Elaine Wynn, Steve Wynn’s ex-wife and co-founder of Wynn Resorts, claimed in a legal filing in a separate litiga­tion that Mr. Wynn had engaged in “serious misconduct” against at least one employee on company property, that the company’s general counsel knew about it and helped to cover it up, and that this information had not been disclosed to the company’s gaming regulators.

The same day, the company issued a press release vehemently denying Ms. Wynn’s allegations and stating that any suggestion that Wynn Resorts had concealed information from its regulators was “patently false.”

Almost two years later, in January 2018, the Wall Street Journal published an article exposing allegations of sexu­al abuse against Mr. Wynn, including that he had paid an employee $7.5 million dollars to settle her claim of being raped by him in 2005. The WSJ article was based on interviews with dozens of Wynn Resorts employees and others who “described a CEO who sexualized his workplace and pressured workers to perform sex acts.” They also noted Mr. Wynn’s power, including his growing political profile. “After Mr. Trump’s 2016 election, Mr. Wynn became the Republican National Committee’s finance chairman.” Wynn’s Resorts’ stock price tanked over 10% in response to the WSJ article’s allegations.

The company issued another statement that day claim­ing that the WSJ article had been instigated by Ms. Wynn, that the company had a hotline for fielding com­plaints about such conduct, and that no one had ever submitted a complaint about Mr. Wynn to that hotline, which falsely implied that no complaints had ever been made about him. Two weeks later, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Depart­ment disclosed that it had received two additional complaints about Mr. Wynn. The stock price again declined.

Gaming regulators in Nevada and Massachusetts immediately opened an investigation into the WSJ article’s allegations, which they ultimately con-firmed through interviews with company personnel and Wynn Resorts’ own internal documents. The company admitted to having failed to investigate and report known complaints about Mr. Wynn’s alleged misconduct. Mr. Wynn eventually stepped down.

This case had numerous twists and turns from the outset. We filed our First Amended Complaint in March 2019, but the district court dismissed the claims, granting us leave to amend. Several months after dismissing the case, the district court judge recused herself without explanation, and a new judge was assigned – Judge Andrew Gordon.

We filed our Second Amended Complaint in July 2020, and in July 2021, Judge Gordon upheld the claims regarding the 2016 press release referenced above by the company denying any misconduct by Mr. Wynn, as well as two other public statements issued by the company and Mr. Wynn denying the Wall Street Journal’s allegations and claiming that the company “had a hotline in place for reporting harassment and similar misconduct.”

“[T]he plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that [defendants] were aware of information contradicting their statements that denied misconduct allegations,” held Judge Andrew P. Gordon. “The inference that these defendants were aware of Wynn’s alleged misconduct at the time of their statements is cogent and compelling.”

Then, just as discovery was beginning and we were set to go after the defendants for their internal documents which we knew would incriminate them, the presiding Magistrate Judge recused himself from the case (again without explanation). The case was randomly assigned to Magistrate Judge Elayna Youchah.

Unbeknownst to us at the time, Judge Youchah had previously represented Wynn Las Vegas and Wynn Resorts as defendants in a federal lawsuit filed by Angelica Limcaco. Ms. Limcaco’s allegations arose from some of the same allegations at issue in our case. She alleged that while she was a salon manager at Wynn Las Vegas, one of the salon manicurists told Ms. Limcaco that Mr. Wynn had raped and impregnated her, and that she was reprimanded and eventually fired after she reported the alleged rape to Wynn Resorts’ human resources department. The alleged rape victim Ms. Limcaco referred to was the same employee mentioned in the explosive WSJ article.

Judge Youchah did not divulge this prior representation to us. Meanwhile, defendants requested that the court bifurcate discovery (i.e., split discovery into two stages – class certification discovery and then merits discovery only if class certification was granted). Judge Youchah granted their request, which significantly delayed the time by which defendants would have to hand over the damaging documents that we needed to prove our case.

Thereafter, we discovered Judge Youchah’s prior repre­sentation of Wynn. Out of an abundance of caution, we promptly filed a motion for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) which requires federal judges, including magistrates, to recuse themselves from any case where “in private practice [s]he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy.” Section 455(b) separately provides that a judge shall also disqualify herself in any proceeding where: “(1) [s]he has a personal bias or prejudice con­cerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” or “(2) in private practice [s]he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom [s]he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it.”

On October 27, 2022, Magistrate Judge Youchah recused herself from Wynn, and Magistrate Brenda Weksler was assigned to the case. All told, six judges recused them­selves from the case over the course of the litigation.

On March 2, 2023, Judge Gordon granted our motion for class certification. This was a critical win in the case because defendants had hoped to cut our class period in order to limit their damages by hundreds of millions of dollars. Defendants attempted to capitalize on the defendant-friendly Supreme Court ruling in 2021, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, 594 U.S. 113 (2021), where the Court held that plaintiffs cannot certify a class unless they can show a match between the alleged misstatements and the cor­rective disclosure. Accordingly, defendants argued that there is a “mismatch” between the company’s general denials of misconduct and the more specific disclosures contained in the WSJ article. The court rightly agreed with us, however, noting that a corrective disclosure need not be a mirror image of the prior fraudulent statements, and that it is sufficient that the disclosure renders “some aspect” of the prior statements false or misleading. This decision is one of the first plaintiffs’ wins in the post Goldman world.

Even though we now had a green light on merits discov­ery, defendants fought us relentlessly on producing any documents of substance. Meanwhile, they filed a highly premature motion for summary judgment, which again tried to knock out the corrective disclosure that held hun­dreds of millions of dollars in damages. We countered by asking the court to deny defendants’ motion because they still had not produced the documents needed to de­cide the motion. At the same time, we moved to compel the defendants to produce the relevant documents.

We won on both counts. First, the new magistrate judge granted in large part our motion to compel. A few days later, the district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and forbade them from refiling it until they had produced all the discovery we were lack­ing. Shortly after these two significant wins, the parties mediated and achieved the highly favorable $70 million settlement.

According to Partner Murielle Steven Walsh, who leads the case, there are two important takeaways. “First,” she says, “it serves as a warning to corporations and their officers that talk is not, in fact, cheap. Investors care about corporate integrity and accountability, and companies that are accused of making statements to cover up or deny allegations of serious misconduct by executives face a potentially steep financial reckoning. Second, don’t give up the good fight even when the odds seem stacked against you. Eventually, justice will prevail.”

The case is Ferris v. Wynn Resorts Ltd., No. 2:18-cv-00479 (D. Nev.).

Pomerantz Settles Case Alleging “Dark Practices”

By Jonathan D. Park

On August 26, 2024, Pomerantz secured preliminary ap­proval of a $3.6 million settlement in a securities class action against Global Payments, Inc. (“GPN”) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The case was initially filed after the federal Con­sumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) sued GPN’s wholly owned subsidiary, Active Network, LLC (“Active Network”), for alleged deceptive practices in violation of federal consumer protection law.

GPN is a payments technology company that provides software and services to merchants and financial insti­tutions. Active Network provides registration and pay­ment processing services to organizers of events such as summer camps and athletic competitions. Many such organizers, rather than building their own registration and payment infrastructure, contract with a vendor like Active Network. In such a case, when an individual registers for that organizer’s event, they are directed to a webpage built by Active Network to complete the process. Active Network collects the consumer’s payment data (such as a credit card number) and retains a portion of the pay­ment pursuant to its contract with the organizer.

Active Network also has a “discount membership club” called “Active Advantage.” In return for an annual fee, Active Advantage members can redeem discounts for processing fees, beer and wine tastings, sports apparel, flowers, travel, lodging, and race registrations.

Active Network allegedly employed two practices, “dark patterns” and “negative options,” that deceived consum­ers into enrolling in Active Advantage. According to the CFPB, dark patterns are design features that deceive, steer, or manipulate users into behavior that is profitable for a company, but often harmful to users or contrary to their intent, and negative options are terms and condi­tions under which a seller interprets a consumer’s silence or failure to reject or cancel an agreement or service as acceptance of an offer. The CFPB has warned that these may violate consumer protection laws.

Drawing on the CFPB’s allegations and other sources, Pomerantz’s clients alleged that Active Network de­signed its online registration and payment process to deceive consumers into unknowingly accepting “insert­ed offers” to enroll in Active Advantage in the process of registering for events, and that those trial memberships were automatically converted to paid memberships when the unknowing consumers failed to cancel before the trial period ended.

Prior to being acquired by GPN in 2017, Active Network was repeatedly accused of such practices. For instance, the attorneys general of Iowa and Vermont, as well as district attorneys in California, brought cases against the company under consumer protection laws, which Active Network settled. Active Network also settled a consumer class action with similar allegations only months before the GPN acquisition.

Nevertheless, after acquiring Active Network, GPN stated in SEC filings that it was “currently in compliance with existing legal and regulatory requirements.” GPN and its senior officers also touted Active Network’s performance without disclosing that it reflected Active Advantage membership fees charged to unsuspecting consumers.

The CFPB’s action, filed in October 2022, included de­tailed allegations indicating that the defendants’ state­ments were false. After conducting an investigation— which GPN did not disclose—the CFPB alleged that Active Network continued to deceive consumers into accepting the inserted offer for Active Advantage mem­bership, that consumers enrolled in Active Advantage redeemed only 2.8% of the fees they paid, indicating that consumers were unaware of their enrollment (and lead­ing one senior manager to call the program “pure profit” in an internal email), and that Active Network generated over $300 million in fees from Active Advantage since 2011. Pomerantz investigated and uncovered numerous former Active Network employees who corroborated these allegations and alleged that these issues were well known at the company.

After the court largely denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the parties began the discovery process and agreed to settle the case soon thereafter. For its part, the CFPB action was stayed shortly after it was filed, in light of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the CFPB’s funding authority was unconstitutional. After the Supreme Court reversed that decision, the stay of the CFPB’s action was lifted, and that case is now pending.

“AI Washing” – The New Deceptive Marketing Technique

By Zachary Denver

Artificial intelligence, or AI—technology that enables computers to mimic human learning, comprehension, problem solving, and/or decision making—is the “new” hot thing. The trend is driven by innovation in so-called “generative AI”: text, image, audio, and video generating computer programs able to utilize vast data sets to create realistic looking and sounding output. Many imagine that AI first stormed the world in November 2022 with the launch of ChatGPT, but AI tools have been around for years. IBM’s Watson AI system crushed its human competitors on Jeopardy! over thirteen years ago. But with this latest generation of generative AI, every company wants a role in the AI revolution. With this increased desirability, it seems that suddenly every­thing is being advertised as being powered by AI, even when it isn’t.

AI hype has led to a deceptive marketing practice called “AI washing.” Similar to “green washing” – exaggerating positive environmental impact to distract the public or investors from less flattering news – AI washing exag­gerates a company’s effective use of AI technology in its products or operations. AI washing is intended to make a company appear more sophisticated or technologically advanced than it really is by linking it to the technological trend of the moment.

AI washing can take different forms. A company could outright lie about the existence of AI in its products, ex­aggerate AI’s impact on the business or its capabilities, or falsely suggest a new AI system can out-perform existing, non-AI products or systems. AI washing can also involve exaggerating a new AI operation’s sustainability or sug­gesting that AI represents a new direction when its use in a given situation is just a gimmick. AI technology requires massive computing power and data storage as well as up-to-date data sets to feed the algorithm, all of which are costly. It is equally AI washing for a company to tout its new AI system without acknowledging those costs.

Even the largest corporations engage in practices that could be considered AI washing. Amazon has faced ac­cusations of AI washing for its Just Walk Out Program. For Just Walk Out, Amazon publicized an AI-powered system that allowed Amazon Fresh and Amazon Go shoppers to pick up their items and leave without paying because the AI-backed sensors would identify items chosen and bill customers automatically. Pitching the service as an AI play raised Just Walk Out’s profile, but also hid the fact, reported earlier this year, that Amazon needed around 1,000 workers in India to manually check almost three-quarters of transactions. Amazon denied the reports but did admit that the Indian workers were reviewing the system. The takeaway is that Just Walk Out used AI, but not as effectively as Amazon suggested.

The SEC Moves to Clean Up AI Fraud

The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken action on AI washing in moves that portend future scrutiny of the practice. In March 2024, the SEC announced it had settled charges against two investment advisors, Delphia (USA), Inc. and Global Predictions, Inc., for making false and misleading statements about their purported use of artificial intelligence. The firms settled for $225,000 and $175,000 respectively. According to the SEC, both firms were marketing to clients that they were using AI in ways they were not. SEC Chair Gary Gensler warned about false claims concerning AI use. In the press release an­nouncing the settlement, the outgoing Director of SEC’s Division of Enforcement, Gurbir Grewal, while indicating that the Commission would be focused on AI washing in the financial services industry, stated, “[W]e are com­mitted to protecting [investors] against those engaged in ‘AI washing.’”

In June 2024, the SEC followed up with an AI washing charge against an issuer, charging the CEO and founder of AI startup Joonko Diversity, Inc., Ilit Raz, with defraud­ing investors. According to the complaint, Ms. Raz mar­keted Joonko as a technology platform using AI to match customer firms with diverse job candidates to help clients achieve Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion goals, when in reality the platform did not function as Ms. Raz claimed at all. In a press release announcing the complaint, Mr. Grewal called the case “an old school fraud using new school buzzwords like artificial intelligence and automation.” He promised continued policing “against AI-washing and the type of misconduct alleged in to­day’s complaint.”

Chairman Gensler has commented on this topic before. In prepared remarks to Yale Law School in February 2024 on AI more generally, the SEC Chair called out the potential for AI washing and offered advice to those making public statements: “If a company is raising money from the public, though, it needs to be truthful about its use of AI and associated risk.” He continued, “AI washing, whether it’s by companies raising money or financial intermediaries, such as investment advisers and broker-dealers, may violate the securities laws.” Recently, on an episode of his YouTube show “Office Hours,” Mr. Gensler once again warned about AI wash­ing, signaling a further crackdown. He broadened the focus to discuss registrant filings, explaining that com­panies should consider whether AI discussions might be material to investors. Clearly, the SEC will stay focused on this problem.

Investors Won’t Be Left Out to Dry

In addition to SEC scrutiny, AI washing is already gener­ating private securities fraud cases under the Exchange Act and Securities Act. Indeed, in 2024, investors brought at least eight prominent AI washing cases alleg­ing Exchange Act claims.

One prominent example is D’Agostino v. Innodata Inc., et al., No. 2:24-cv-00971 (D.N.J.), where shareholders of Innodata Inc., a global data engineering company focus­ing on AI, allege that Innodata made false claims about its “proprietary, state-of-the-art” “core AI technology stack,” when in reality Innodata lacked viable AI technology, its platform was a rudimentary software, Innodata was not going to meaningfully use AI for new contracts, and it was not effectively investing in research and develop­ment for AI. According to the plaintiffs in the Innodata suit, the truth emerged in a short seller report exposing the company’s AI washing practices.

In Hoare v. Oddity Tech Ltd. et al., No. 1:24-cv-06571 (S.D.N.Y.), shareholders of Oddity, a consumer tech platform that uses AI to identify customer needs and solutions in the beauty and wellness products space, allege that the company overstated its AI technology and capabilities, and the extent to which that tech-nology drove sales. According to the suit, the truth emerged in a short seller report describing discussions with former employees who called the company’s AI “nothing but a questionnaire.”

More litigation seems inevitable as public companies rush to tout their ultimately ephemeral AI-integration and products. Further suits could be driven by companies that include AI disclosures in their public filings without adequately disclosing risk, thus creating the impression of AI usage that materially differs from reality. Chairman Gensler has already hinted that generic risk disclosures for AI will not suffice. In his prepared remarks to Yale, he said “investors benefit from disclosures particularized to the company, not from boilerplate language.”

Section 11 claims under the Securities Act for AI wash­ing in a registration statement may be even more common than Exchange Act Section 10(b) claims. For any startup, the need to appear cutting-edge is powerful, and companies may be tempted to exaggerate AI tools that are actually incidental to the product. Additionally, legitimate technology startups trying to innovate in AI may misstate their readiness to incorporate the tools or overstate what they can do. This is already a prob­lem. According to a 2019 report by tech investment firm, MMC Ventures, 40% of new tech firms that described themselves as “AI start-ups” in fact used virtually no AI at all.

AI washing may be an emerging problem for investors, but as its moniker suggests, it is just another form of misleading customers and investors: an old school fraud using new school buzzwords. The securities laws apply to the new as well as the old.